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Abstract
Cooperative agent and robot systems are designed so that each is working to-
ward the same common good. The problem is that the software systems are extremely
complex and can be subverted by an adversary to either break the system or poten-
tially worse, create sneaky agents who are willing to cooperate when the stakes are
low and take selfish, greedy actions when the rewards rise. This research focuses on
the ability of a group of agents to reason about the trustworthiness of each other
and make decisions about whether to cooperate. A trust-based interactive partially
observable Markov decision process (TI-POMDP) is developed to model the trust
interactions between agents, enabling the agents to select the best course of action
from the current state. The TI-POMDP is a novel approach to multiagent coopera-
tion based on an interactive partially observable Markov decision process (I-POMDP)
augmented with trust relationships.
Experiments using the Defender simulation demonstrate the TI-POMDP’s abil-
ity to accurately track the trust levels of agents with hidden agendas The TI-POMDP
provides agents with the information needed to make decisions based on their level of
trust and model of the environment. Testing demonstrates that agents quickly iden-
tify the hidden trust levels and mitigate the impact of a deceitful agent in comparison
with a trust vector model. Agents using the TI-POMDP model achieved 3.8 times
the average reward of agents using a trust vector model.
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I. Introduction
In a cooperative system, groups agents accomplish tasks by working together andleveraging the skills and abilities of every agent. While the decisions of individual
agents may not maximize their personal gain, they attempt to maximize the overall
reward for the group through these cooperative actions [3]. These cooperative actions
leverage the individual capabilities of several agents to perform complex tasks beyond
the ability of a single agent.
The complex programming required to generate cooperation and allow coordina-
tion among agents presents a target for adversaries trying to reduce the effectiveness
of the system. Cooperative systems are based on an underlying level of trust (either
implicit or explicit) among the group of agents, and the potential exists for “sneaky”
agents to exploit this trust by cooperating when the stakes are low and taking self-
ish, greedy actions when the rewards rise. Ultimately, these actions can degrade the
performance of the system leading to a complete lack of cooperation.
The concept of trust is central to agent interactions [10] in much the same way
as human interactions. Just as a person refuses to buy a car from a salesman he does
not trust, an autonomous agent refuses to cooperate with an agent it does not trust.
Trust can be thought of as the fundamental difference between a cooperative and a
competitive environment. In a completely cooperative environment, the agents trust
and rely on one another to accomplish their goals. In a competitive environment,
agent a believes that agent b will act in its own best interests to the detriment of
agent a. In between lies a gray area where agents must choose whether to cooperate
based on their belief in the trustworthiness of others.
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Typical trust modeling treats trust as a “hidden” rating [18, 22, 25]. Once an
agent identifies the appropriate rating of another agent, it uses that rating to deter-
mine whether or not to interact with the other agent. This method is similar to the
eBay™ user rating system. An eBay buyer looks at the ratings of a seller before decid-
ing to purchase an item. If the seller has a positive score, the buyer can purchase with
confidence. An occasional pitfall with this system is a deceitful seller looking to cash
out. The seller builds a large positive rating before selling several high priced items
that he never intends to deliver. Buyers pay for the items and the seller vanishes with
the money.
A similar scenario can play out in a multi-agent environment for a variety of
reasons. A sneaky agent can act trustworthy for a period of time to build trust until
it decides to betray the other agents. A “hacker” can alter an agent’s programming
causing it to compete instead of cooperate. A random bit flip could corrupt an agent
causing it to behave sporadically. In a world where trusting the wrong agent once
can lead to the loss of time, money, and system capabilities, a reliable autonomous
agent requires a robust ability to determine the true intentions of the other agents
it interacts with. This paper takes a step down the path to robust agent reasoning
through a multi-agent environment based on trust modeling. This chapter defines the
problem, describes the goal of this research, presents the methodology, examines the
significance and limitations of the study, and outlines the paper format.
1.1 Problem
This research focuses on the ability of a group of agents to reason about the
trustworthiness of each other and make optimal decisions about whether to cooper-
ate. The agents attempt to maximize the common reward of the system while still
protecting their individual interests. When possible, the agents attempt to cooperate
with one another with the expectation of receiving some benefit from the cooperation.
To successfully cooperate, the agents must be able to identify the appropriate
level of trust to place in one another and identify when that trust level changes [10].
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Failing to identify the appropriate level of trust opens an agent to exploitation and
increases the potential for an agent to miss an opportunity for cooperation.
While trust modeling usually focuses on an individual agent’s level of trust in
the other entities it interactions with [18,25], this research attempts to create a multi-
agent model that entails the trust models and decision processes of all of the agents in
the environment. This level of modeling captures the impact of individual actions and
trust fluctuations on the entire collective as the agents to manage domain uncertainty.
1.2 Research Goal
The goal of this research is to merge trust modeling and multi-agent decision
making so that agents can use their perception of the world (including their estimate of
the trustworthiness of others) to select an appropriate course of action when the other
agents in the collective become corrupted. The specific objectives of this research are:
• Develop a trust-base multi-agent framework that allows agents to make deci-
sions according to their beliefs about the current state of the world and the
trustworthiness of the other agents.
• Implement the trust-based multi-agent framework in a simulation to demon-
strate cooperation as an emerging behavior.
• Test the trust-based multi-agent framework against a trust vector model [17] to
demonstrate the utility of the framework.
The simulation and testing must answer the question of whether the addition of
trust modeling results in better agent decisions. The framework must be adaptable,
support a wide range of individual trust models, and include the ability of individual
agents to use unique models within the same environment.
1.3 Methodology
This thesis describes the TI-POMDP, a multi-agent framework that takes the
novel approach of combining a multi-agent decision process with trust modeling. This
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framework expands trust modeling to demonstrate the impact of trust on a group of
agents, rather than just an individual agent. The framework is based on a modified
I-POMDP [7] with trust modeling added into the decision making process. The trust
model is updated with the observations from the I-POMDP portion of the frame-
work. The updated trust model then aids the state belief update of the I-POMDP
portion. While an experience-based trust model [2] is used in the demonstration of
this framework, any trust model could be used. Because the framework is based on the
I-POMDP, an optimal solution to the framework requires up to double exponential
time [21].
A two agent game and a multi-agent simulation are used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the framework, specifically looking at the amount of cooperation between
agents and rewards achieved by the agents. The game is a modified version of the
Tiger Game [7,13]. The multi-agent simulation models a group of agents attempting
to cooperate in an environment with fluctuating trust. Testing includes an analy-
sis of the simulation settings that affect the framework results, a demonstration of
the framework execution time, and a comparison between the framework and a trust
vector model [17].
This research assumes that all environment agents are operating within the
framework and that groups of agents can not collude to subvert the ability of the
framework. While the simulation entails factors in addition to trust modeling, the
testing is designed to explore the specific effects of the trust modeling. The testing
does not include communications between the agents. This eliminates the usage of
trust models that are based on reputation networks [22,24].
1.4 Significance
This research merges the high level decision reasoning of a multi-agent envi-
ronment with the individual oversight of trust modeling. The end result is a deci-
sion framework that allows unique agents to reason about the trustworthiness of one
another. The agents determine whether to work with other agents that may have
4
different capabilities and different trust models. In the simulation, the agents using
the TI-POMDP accomplish tasks 36.2 percent faster and receive 3.8 times the average
reward of agents using a trust vector model [17].
1.5 Outline
This thesis is divided into six Chapters including this introduction. Chapter II
provides a literature review of the current work in solving multi-agent environments
and trust modeling. Chapter III describes the framework modeling a multi-agent
environment incorporating trust into the agent decision process. Chapter IV presents
a simulation based on the framework from Chapter III. In addition, Chapter IV
outlines the testing methodology used to validate the simulation. Chapter V presents
the results and analysis of the testing. Chapter VI provides the detailed conclusion of
the trust-based multi-agent environment and outlines future areas of research. This
thesis is designed for readers with a working knowledge of I-POMDPs, but related
work is referenced where applicable.
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II. Literature Review
Similar to heavy objects needing two or more people to lift, many problem do-mains require multiple agents to satisfy all domain requirements. A given task
may require specialized skills from two or more agents, or the task could require mul-
tiple agents in separate locations at the same time. Either way, the overall problem
complexity increases as coordination and cooperation components are added to each
individual agent. This chapter includes a brief description of a state within an en-
vironment, examines existing multi-agent environment models, and presents a wide
range of trust modeling techniques.
2.1 States
In an environment, the state is the current setting of all variables within the
environment. Some settings may be known (location, time of day, etc.) while other
may not be observable (that agent’s intentions, the man behind the curtain, etc.).
As forces act upon the environment items, the settings with respect to those items
change, resulting in a different state. Ultimately, the current state is the result of the
initial settings of the environment plus all of the actions that altered those settings.
While tracking the initial state and every action taken provides a precise esti-
mate of the current state, it represents a very long path. Estimating my current state
in this manner would require examining every step I have taken, every class I have
attended, and all of the other numerous factors throughout my life. This same path
exists for a simple agent operating in an environment. Its current state is based on
its initial position plus all of the actions it has taken, but trying to track all of the
calculations and operations a computer makes for even a minute is a very large task.
Fortunately, that long train of calculations and operations can be reduced and
still provide an accurate estimate of the current state. For instance, a college student
trying to find his roommate does not need to retrace all of the steps the roommate
has taken in life, the student only needs to remember that the roommate said he was
hungry fifteen minutes ago to realize the roommate is at the cafeteria. Similarly, an
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agent may know that another agent just completed a task in a given location and
assume that agent is still in the vicinity of the task. This is an example of the Markov
assumption which says that the current state only depends on a finite history of the
previous states [20]. All of the multi-agent environments reviewed in the following
section utilize the Markov assumption to eliminate the need to maintain a complete
list of every previous environment state.
2.2 Multi-agent Environments
Single agent domains can be modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) [4].
An MDP is defined by the tuple 〈S,A,T,R〉, where
• S is the set containing the finite number of environment states.
• A is the set of actions an agent can take.
• T is the transition model S ×A → S ′ that defines the probability that an agent’s
actions in an initial state s will change to state s′.
• R is the expected reward an agent receives from taking action a in state s and
reaching state s′.
The MDP selects the course of action from a given state with the highest ex-
pected reward. At each time step, an agent in state s performs action a attempting
to reach state s′ which holds the highest expected reward r. Transition distribution
t maintains the probability of going from s to s′ by performing a.
An MDP requires that an agent is operating in a fully observable environment,
meaning the current state of the agent is known. The agent is not capable of dealing
with uncertainty about its current state or partial observability.
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [13] allows a single
agent to cope with uncertainty about its current state while operating in a stochastic
environment. A POMDP is defined by the tuple 〈S, A, T, Ω,O, R〉, where
• S,A, T, and R are unchanged from the MDP.
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• Ω is the finite set of observations an agent can make about its environment.
• O : S x A →
∏
(Ω) is the observation function which returns the probability of
making observation o given that an agent took action a to get to state s′.
The POMDP uses memory about previous actions and observations to deter-
mine states. An agent’s state belief is a distribution over S. The state belief is defined
by the equation:
bti(s
t) = βOi(o
t
i, s
t, at−1i )
∑
st−1εS
bt−1i (s
t−1)Ti(st, ati, s
t−1) (2.1)
where:
• bti(st) is agent i’s belief b at time t that the state is s.
• β is a normalizing constant.
The belief, bti, in the current state being s
t encompasses the changes in the initial
belief, bt−1i , as a result of taking action, a
t−1
i , at time, t − 1, resulting in the current
set of observations, oti.
A decision policy describes an agent’s behavior by mapping what action an
agent takes in each state and is defined as S → A.
The policy that includes the decision for every state is defined by the equation:
π∞t (s) =
argmax
a
[
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′εS
T (s, a, s′)U∞t−1(s
′)
]
(2.2)
where:
• π is the decision policy S → A specifying the action a to be taken in state s.
• γ is a decay factor.
• U is the expected future reward from state s.
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Solving for the optimal policy requires finding the action for each state with
the highest expected reward after an infinite number of decisions. While learning the
optimal policy is undecidable for an infinite horizon, approximation techniques can
be used to determine a reasonable policy.
Value iteration [13] finds the optimal policy to a horizon of t by iterating through
all permutations of state-action transitions to determine the path with the highest
expected reward. Instead of predefining t, the iteration continues until the expected
reward difference between consecutive levels (t and t − 1) is less than some small ε.
Policy iteration [20] evaluates the utility of every state using the current policy and
then calculates a new policy based on the maximum expected utility of the subsequent
state. This process repeats until the current policy and the new policy converge.
The computational complexity of the decision policy can be further reduced
using other techniques. Behavioral equivalence [16] is used to collapse large numbers
of states into a manageable space. Particle filtering [8] uses particles to represent
possible states and carries a subset of particles forward in time. Alpha-beta minimax
[20], modified A∗ search [23] and dynamic programming [12] can be used to quickly
prune dominated branches of the search tree. Additionally, the problem domain
dimensionality can be reduced using principal component analysis [19].
Given a decision policy, the an agent’s expected reward for a finite horizon of t
from state s is calculated inductively by:
Uπ,t(s) = R(s, πt(s)) + γ
∑
s′εS
T (s, πt(s), s
′)Uπ,t−1(s′) (2.3)
where:
• πt is a non-stationary decision policy that is executed for t time steps.
To find the optimal solution to the expected reward for a given state, all possible
future states s′ must be considered as well as the probability of their occurrence
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(T (s, πt(s), s
′)) and their expected reward value. The future states s′ are dependent
on their future states s′′ in the same manner.
The finite horizon assumes the decision policy changes with each time step
because the agent is reaching the endgame. In a given state, an agent might make
a greedy decision if it knows there are no long term consequences because this is its
final decision. Conversely, the agent chooses to maximize future reward by selecting
a different action from the same state earlier in its decision tree. Using an infinite
horizon, the agent’s decision policy does not change with time because the agent never
approaches the endgame. The expected reward for an infinite horizon is given by the
recursive equation:
Uπ(s) = R(s, π(s)) + γ
∑
s′εS
T (s, π(s), s′)Uπ(s′) (2.4)
Unfortunately, the traditional POMDP can not handle a multi-agent environ-
ment, but it can be expanded. The decentralized-POMDP (DEC-POMDP) [3] is
defined by the tuple 〈I, S, A, T, R, Ω, O, h〉
where:
• I is the number of agents in the environment.
• h is a positive integer representing the finite horizon.
In the DEC-POMDP, the state transitions T and rewards R are dependent on
the actions of all the agents in the environment. The POMDP is a special case of
the DEC-POMDP with only 1 agent in the environment. Ultimately the single group
reward for all of the agents works well in a cooperative environment.
While the expected reward calculations do not change from the POMDP (Equa-
tions 2.3 and 2.4), the policy function does change.
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UTπ (s) =
∑
〈ō1,ō2〉
∑
qεS
∑
s′εS
T̄π(s, ō1, ō2, q)T (q, π1(ō1), π2(ō2), s
′)R(q, π1(ō1), π2(ō2), s′)
(2.5)
In the DEC-POMDP, the policy function depends on the policies and states
of all of the agents in the environment. Equation 2.5 is the policy function for a
DEC-POMDP with two agents.
The I-POMDP [7] builds further on the framework expanding the concept of
states to include the beliefs an agent has about other agents (agent states, intentions,
and beliefs). An I-POMDP, consists of the tuple 〈ISi, A, Ti, Ωi, Oi, Ri〉 for each agent
i within the environment, where
• ISi is the set of interactive states S×Mj, with S being the set of environment
states, and Mj is the set of models of agent j. Each model mj consists of the pair
〈fj,hj〉 where fj is a function that maps the possible histories of j’s observations
to its actions and hj is one of the possible histories.
• A is the set Ai × Aj of joint actions of all agents.
• Ti is S ×A× S ′ which is the transition model that defines the probability that
an agent’s actions will change the state.
• Ωi is the set of observations an agent can make.
• Oi is S × A× Ωi which is the probability that agent taking action a in state s
will make observations Ω.
• Ri is ISi × A → R which is the expected reward agent i receives from taking
action a in states is.
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Building off the POMDP belief update, Equation 2.1, the I-POMDP belief
update is
bti(is
t) =β
∑
ist−1:m̂t−1j =θ̂
t
j
bt−1i (is
t−1)
∑
at−1j
Pr(at−1j |θt−1j )Oi(st, at−1, oti)
·Ti(st−1, at−1, st)
∑
otj
τθtj(b
t−1
j , a
t−1
j , o
t
j, b
t
j)Oj(s
t, at−1, otj) (2.6)
where:
•
∑
ist−1:m̂t−1j =θ̂
t
j
is the summation over all is where agent j’s frame is θ̂tj
• θ is an agent’s type.
• bj is agent j’s belief elements of type θj.
• Pr(at−1j |θt−1j ) is the probability that agent j took action a at the last time step
given its type θj.
• Oj is agent j’s observation function.
• τθtj(b
t−1
j , a
t−1
j , o
t
j, b
t
j) is agent j’s belief update.
The policy function for the I-POMDP is
π∞t (is) =
argmax
a
[
R(is, a) + γ
∑
is′εIS
T (is, a, is′)U∞t−1(is
′)
]
(2.7)
The policy function solves for the maximum expected reward of each interactive
state. The maximum expected reward for a finite horizon is
U(θi) =
max
aiεAi
{ ∑
is
ERi(isi, ai)bi(is) + γ
∑
oiεΩi
Pr(oi|ai, bi)
·U(〈SEθi(bi, ai, oi), θ̂i〉)
}
(2.8)
where:
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• ERi(is, ai) is the expected reward for taking action ai in interactive state is.
ERi(is, ai) =
∑
aj Ri(is, ai, aj)Pr(aj|mj).
• SEθi is the state estimation, an abbreviation of the belief update.
The maximum expected reward for an infinite horizon is
OPT (θi) =
argmax
aiεAi
{ ∑
is
ERi(isi, ai)bi(is) + γ
∑
oiεΩi
Pr(oi|ai, bi)
·U(〈SEθi(bi, ai, oi), θ̂i〉)
}
(2.9)
The I-POMDP represents a series of individual POMDPs. In addition to the
computational complexity of the POMDP (multiplied by the number of agents in
the environment), the I-POMDP has additional nesting within the belief model of
the agents. Each agent possesses beliefs about the other agents in the environment,
and these beliefs include the other agent’s beliefs about all of the other agents. This
nesting continues infinitely as the agent tries to reason about the other agent’s models
as depicted in Figure 2.1. The typical solution to this infinite nesting limits the trace
to a strategy level, l, usually the first belief model of the other agents, using the
Markov assumption [21]. At the 0-th level of nesting, the other agents actions are
added to the noise of the T,O, and R functions. The first level beliefs become a
probability distribution over S and the 0-th level models of the other agents. The
first level beliefs are solved as a series of POMDPs of the 0-th level models. The
individual POMDPs are solved using the policy function and reward function from
the POMDP discussion. According to Seuken [21], an I-POMDP is PSPACE-hard for
finite-time horizons, undecidable for an infinite horizon, and an optimal I-POMDP
algorithm takes up to double exponential time.
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Figure 2.1: Recursive belief nesting of an agent’s model of the
other agents.
2.3 Trust
One of the underlying assumptions with many of the multi-agent environments is
that the agents are cooperating to achieve the highest reward possible (DEC-POMDP
is one example), but that is not always the case. Many problems require the agent
domain to mimic the human world where adversaries are working against one another.
The problem can be further compounded when an adversary acts like a genuine ally
to gain trust that can be exploited later. If one component of an automated net-
work defense suite is compromised, the other components still trust the compromised
component. This trust allows the other components to be circumvented or corrupted
themselves.
The main hurdle with a trust based environment is defining and learning the
trust values for each agent. There are several proposed methods for generating the
initial trust model.
• Experience-Based
Experience based models [2] rely on past interactions. The outcomes of previous
interactions form the agent’s trust rating for future interactions. This type of
model is useful in domains that allow repeated interactions with the same agents.
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• Attitude-Based
An extension of the experience-based model is a game theoretic model where
an agent selects it willingness to sacrifice its own reward to benefit its oppo-
nents reward [6]. The agent learns its opponent’s “attitude” through repeated
interactions. The agent adjusts its own “attitude” based on whether it can ben-
efit from helping its opponent. The combination of these “attitudes” plus an
expected reciprocation threshold guides an agent’s decision to cooperate.
• Reinforcement Learning
One of the basic ways is to build a trust estimate is through reinforcement
learning. Reinforcement learning allows an agent to generate its model of the
world (in this case the trust rating of another agent) through interactions with
the world [20]. As an agent interacts with its surroundings, it receives positive
rewards reinforcing its current behavior or negative rewards causing it to change
behavior. If agent a trusts agent b to perform a task and b fails to accomplish
its mission, then a does not receive its expected reward. Agent a can determine
that agent b is untrustworthy and refuse to cooperate with b in the future.
• Network
A common approach builds a network of trusted agents [22,24], also called rep-
utation modeling. An agent polls its network to get recommendations about
an unknown agent, and the agents in its network return their recommendations
which are then combined. If one of polled agents does not have a recommen-
dation about the unknown agent, it will poll its own trust network for recom-
mendations. This method is useful in larger multi-agent environments where an
agent is not constantly interacting with the same agent. The network approach
allows agents to pass information back and forth, quickly propagating the out-
comes of past interactions. This method does not work for domains with only
a few agents because there is no network to build.
• Preliminary Interactions
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A drawback to reinforcement learning is that agents may only get 1 opportunity
to trust another agent. In the worst case, trusting a deceitful agent can lead to
the destruction of the agent. A proposed solution to this problem is to allow
initial interaction between agents prior to a decision about whether or not to
cooperate [18]. The agents discuss their intentions and the responses given are
classified into clusters representing the honesty makeup of the population. An
agent decides whether to cooperate based on the classification of the other agent.
The concept is designed to mimic the human ability to determine whether or
not to trust someone based on an initial feeling, but the preliminary interaction
may not always be feasible in a multi-agent environment.
• Trust Vectors
The concept of differing levels of trust led to the creation of trust vectors [17].
Each level or parameter of trust is given a numeric value. The numeric values are
stored in a single vector that is normalized to give a trust rating at a particular
time. Trust vectors allow trust modeling to extend to multidimensional domains
where an agent is trustworthy in some aspects and deceitful in others.
• Adaptive Trust
Adaptive trust modeling [10] dynamically combines reputation-based models
and experience-based models. Reputation systems suffer when reputations are
inaccurate. Experience systems have difficulty forming initial trust ratings and
suffer in environments that do not allow repeated interactions. Leveraging both
models allows an agent to overcome the drawbacks of the individual models.
• Fuzzy Sets
Trust ratings based on fuzzy sets [1] use a series of overlapping categories to
determine the trust rating of an agent. An agent’s trust rating is based on the
aggregate of the probabilities that the agent belongs to each of the individual
categories. Once again, a time decay function can be used to reduce the impact
of less recent actions.
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Once an agent knows whom he trusts, the agent simply chooses to work with the
trusted agents and isolates the untrusted agents. The established trust levels must be
updated as agents come and go within the environment. If a trusted agent leaves for a
period of time and reemerges, its identity must be authenticated to mitigate the risk
of interacting with an agent spoofing the trusted agent. To combat this problem, an
agent can be the responsibility of the entity that placed the agent within the domain.
The entity can encode information in the agent known only to the entity that other
agents would use to authenticate the true identity of the agent [25].
Additionally, agents must continuously reevaluate their trust rankings of the
other agents. Reevaluation is used to capture changing trust levels and can be applied
to sneaky agents that cooperate when the stakes are low to build trust before betraying
to achieve a large reward.
2.3.1 Trust Objectives. Karen Fullam, et al. developed a comprehensive list
of objectives for trust-based research [11] to help guide research and aid in comparison
testing. The objectives include building trust models that are adaptive, accurate,
quickly converging, multidimensional, and efficient. Once these basic requirements
are met, agents must be able to identify and isolate untrustworthy agents, evaluate
the utility of an interaction, and ultimately decide whether and with whom to interact.
Several specific areas exist within trust research. Determining the best way
to initialize a trust model is difficult, especially for experience-based systems. For
any trust system, setting the threshold to revisit trusted or untrusted neighbors is
a balance between returning too rarely which misses changes in trust and returning
too often which wastes computation cycles. The time decay of past interactions tries
to maintain past histories of betrayal while not making it impossible for an agent to
redeem itself. This is critical for experience-based and trust vector models that rely
heavily on past interactions. Reputation-based and similar models are influenced by
the neighbor nodes that relay information to an agent. If the agent does not trust any
of its neighbors, that agent becomes isolated from the rest of the environment. This
17
research focuses on the model representation used and the revisit rate of relearning
agent trust levels.
2.4 Trust in Multi-agent Environments
The addition of trust into a system reduces the options for formulating the
coordination problem. By definition, an MDP and a POMDP can not fully cap-
ture the domain because they are designed for single agents. An environment with
trust modeling possesses cooperative agents working together and competitive agents
attempting to achieve higher individual rewards. The different motives creates the
need for individual reward functions that model these motives. The DEC-POMDP is
not designed to handle the individual reward functions. That leaves the I-POMDP
framework as a starting point for our trust environment. Within this framework, trust
may be modeled in multiple dimensions where an agent can be trustworthy in some
aspects, but prone to lying in others.
2.5 Summary
Agent models are often dictated by the complexity of the tasks the agents are
designed to perform and the environment they operate in. Single agent models are
typically defined by the amount of certainty the agent has about it environment.
As agent certainty increases, model complexity can decrease. Multi-agent models tie
multiple instantiations of the single agent model together allowing agents to cooperate
with one another while still operating independently. Among the multi-agent models,
the I-POMDP allows the largest amount of individual behavior within the framework.
Each agent has its own reward function and attempts to determine the beliefs of every
other agent within the environment.
The individual reward functions and belief models allow the I-POMDP to incor-
porate trust representations. Trust representations are used to determine whether an
agent will cooperate or compete with another agent. The individual reward functions
embody an agent’s trust level. A competitive agent values actions that hinder the
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other agents while a cooperative agent values actions that benefit the collective. The
individual belief models are used to determine the trust level of another agent.
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III. Trust-based I-POMDP
The basic goal of the multi-agent environments and trust models described inChapter II is to create agents that make decisions based on their interpretation
of the world around them. In the multi-agent environments, agents try to determine
the current state of the world and select the most beneficial action based on a future
expected reward. The trust models analyze the agents in the world to select the most
beneficial cooperative action based on the probability of its success. The similarly
aligned goals create a natural merger between the two mechanisms to create a complex
multi-agent environment where agents reason about trust and the environment state
to aid their decision making.
This complex multi-agent environment is the TI-POMDP framework described
in this chapter. The TI-POMDP incorporates trust modeling to determine which
agents are willing to cooperate with one another while using the decision making
process of the I-POMDP [7]. The TI-POMDP mirrors the I-POMDP framework with
additional trust components implemented as needed. The trust components directly
impact several pieces of the traditional I-POMDP framework without altering the
mechanisms used to analyze and reason about the multi-agent environment. The
trust implementation is not constrained to a specific trust model (i.e. experience-
based [2], reputation-based [22], or trust vector [17]) which allows the framework to
be easily modified for a variety of domains.
3.1 Framework Development
The TI-POMDP is an extension of the I-POMDP [7]. The TI-POMDP main-
tains the basic components of the I-POMDP while incorporating trust modeling as
a primary decision factor for the agents. In addition to the state belief model (an
agent’s estimate of the current environment), an agent maintains and updates a trust
model (a rating of the trustworthiness of the other agents) for the environment. This
trust model contains an agent’s level of trust in the other agents. This level of trust
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helps the agent decide whether or not to cooperate with another agent on a given
task.
Modifying the I-POMDP framework (Section 2.2) requires identifying the com-
ponents of the I-POMDP tuple, 〈ISi, A, Ti, Ωi, Oi, Ri〉, that are directly affected by
trust modeling. While almost every component is affected to some extent, most com-
ponents only receive an increased set or function size.
In the I-POMDP, the interactive state (ISi) is the cross product of the state(s)
and the model (an estimate of the other agent’s state belief based on their past
actions) of the other agents in the environment. Adding the trust model to the I-
POMDP combines an agent’s state belief with its current trust model. An agent’s
current state has an additional focus on which agents it can cooperate with and which
agents it should betray.
The set of actions (A) an agent can take does not directly change. The actions
an agent takes can now result in cooperation, betrayal, or some other interaction with
the other agents in the environment.
The transition function (Ti) becomes more complex as the agent’s trust model
is updated during state transitions. The transition function covers a larger range of
inputs and outputs as the number of states increase.
The set of observations (Ωi) increases as an agent must have observations that
distinguish between cooperative and corruptive actions. In order to reason about the
intentions and trustworthiness of another agent. The observation function (Oi) covers
a larger range of outputs due to the increased observation set.
The reward function (Ri) is dependent on an agent’s trust model which increases
the size of the function. The size increase is due to the reward function handling
both trustworthy and deceitful agents. A trustworthy agent values states that allow
cooperation with other trusted agents while the untrustworthy agent values states
that allow exploitation of the other agents [15]. As an agent’s trust model shifts, its
reward function must account for the shift. In a given state where all other agents
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are trustworthy, agent a’s decision is based on its expected reward and its expected
reward is based on its reward function. If agent a is trustworthy, its reward function
associates high reward values with cooperative tasks and low reward values with
betraying tasks, but if agent a is untrustworthy, its reward function associates low
reward values with cooperative tasks and high reward values with betraying tasks.
The trust model is an agent’s current assessment of the level of trust it can place
in the other agents. Each time the agent observes the actions of another, it adjusts
its trust level of the other agent accordingly.
3.2 TI-POMDP Framework
The trust belief model used in the TI-POMDP is defined by τ . Agent i’s trust
belief model includes the true trust level of i and i’s estimate of the trust level for
every other agent j in the environment. In addition, i must also estimate every other
agent j’s trust level for every other agent j′ in the environment. This includes agent
j’s trust level of agent i. If agents i, j, and k are all assigned to a task and agent
i believes all three agents are trustworthy, agent i may still avoid cooperating on
the task if it believes that agent j does not trust agent k. The reward function R
examines τi to determine the expected reward for a given state. If agent j does not
trust agent k according to τi, then agent i’s expected reward for working with agents
j and k decreases because agent i does not believe that agent j will work with agent
k resulting in agent j not fully cooperating on the task.
Table 3.1 illustrates a simple binary trust model for Agent 1. Each column
represents Agent 1’s belief about a given agent’s trust model. The Agent 1 column
shows Agent 1’s the actual trust value and its ratings of Agents 2 and 3. The ratings of
Agents 2 and 3 are the primary influences on whether Agent 1 is willing to cooperate
with the other agents. The Agent 2 column shows Agent 1’s estimate of Agent 2’s
ratings. Agent 2’s rating of itself is always identical to Agent 1’s rating of Agent
2 since both ratings are based on Agent 1’s beliefs. The Agent 3 column has the
estimate of Agent 3’s ratings.
22
Table 3.1: An agent’s trust model τ of the other
agents in the environment. The trust model depicted
is a binary model.
Level of Trust Agent
in Agent 1 2 3
1 1 0 1
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 1
In this trust model, Agent 1 trusts Agents 2 and 3, but does not believe that
Agent 2 trust it or that Agent 3 trusts Agent 2. Based on this trust model, Agent 1
does not believe that Agent 2 is willing to cooperate with it. In addition, if Agents 2
and 3 are trying to work together, Agent 1 believes that Agent 2 tries to cooperate
but Agent 3 does not based on its rating.
While the binary trust system is illustrated here, other trust models can be used.
Each rating in the table represents a complete trust model system for that rating. If
trust vectors [17] are used as the trust model, each rating becomes an individual trust
vector with Agent 1’s estimates of which actions the other agents observed and how
they analyzed those actions. If a reputation network [24] is the trust model, each
rating is Agent 1’s estimate of the information the other agents received from the
network.
After adding trust to the I-POMDP framework, the TI-POMDP tuple remains
〈ISi, A, Ti, Ωi, Oi, Ri, 〉, where
• ISi for agent i is the set of interactive states S × Mj where S is the set of
environment states, and Mj is a model of agent j, ∀j 6= i . Each state s includes
a trust belief model τi. Each model mj consists of the tuple 〈fj, hj, τi,j〉 where
fj is a function that maps the possible histories of j’s observations and i’s trust
belief model of j to j’s actions, hj is one of the possible observation histories,
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and τi,j is i’s trust rating of j. Agent i uses mj to predict agent j’s actions.
Agent i bases its action decision in part on the prediction of agent j’s action.
• A is the set Ai × Aj of joint actions of all agents.
• Ti is S×A×S ′ which is the transition model that defines the probability that an
agent’s actions will change the state. The change in state includes the change
τi.
• Ωi is the set of observations an agent can make.
• Oi is S × A× Ωi which is the probability that agent taking action a in state s
will make observations Ω.
• Ri is ISi × A → R which is the expected reward agent i receives from taking
action a in state is.
Building on the I-POMDP belief update, Equation 2.6, the TI-POMDP belief
update is
bti(τi, is
t) =β
∑
ist−1:m̂t−1j =θ̂
t
j
bt−1i (τi, is
t−1)
∑
at−1j
Pr(at−1j |θt−1j )Oi(st, at−1, oti)
·Ti(st−1, at−1, st)
∑
otj
τθtj(b
t−1
j , a
t−1
j , o
t
j, b
t
j)Oj(s
t, at−1, otj) (3.1)
where:
• τi is agent i’s trust model.
• bti(τi, ist) is agent i’s belief b at time t that the interactive state is is.
• β is a normalizing constant.
•
∑
ist−1:m̂t−1j =θ̂
t
j
is the summation over all is where agent j’s frame is θ̂tj
• θ is an agent’s type.
• bj is agent j’s belief elements of type θj.
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• Pr(at−1j |θt−1j ) is the probability that agent j took action a at the last time step
given its type θj.
• Oj is agent j’s observation function.
• τθtj(b
t−1
j , a
t−1
j , o
t
j, b
t
j) is agent j’s belief update.
The state belief update still requires a decision policy as outlined in the POMDP
discussion in Section 2.2. The same approximation techniques used for solving other
POMDP instances (Value Iteration [13], Behavioral Equivalence [16], etc.) are used
to reduce the search space and solve the TI-POMDP.
While an agent does not directly alter another agent’s belief model, an agent’s
actions affect the current state which does change the other agent’s current observa-
tions. The other agent attempts to reconcile its current observations with its expected
observations by adjusting its belief model including the models of all of the agents
in the environment. Adjusting the models of all of the agents includes adjusting the
estimated trust levels of each of the agents.
Each belief state has an associated maximum expected reward as defined by
U(θi) =
max
aiεAi
{∑
is
ERi(τi, isi, ai)bi(τi, is) + γ
∑
oiεΩi
Pr(oi|ai, bi)
·U(〈SEθi(bi, ai, oi), θ̂i〉)
}
(3.2)
where:
• U(θi) is the expected future reward for an agent of type θ.
• γ is a decay factor.
• ERi(τi, isi, ai) is the expected reward for taking action ai in interactive state isi
with trust model τi. ERi(τi, isi, ai) =
∑
aj Ri(τi, is, ai, aj)Pr(aj|mj).
• SEθi is the state estimation, an abbreviation of the belief update.
25
Figure 3.1: The event cycle for the TI-POMDP.
3.3 Model Updates
Each time step, an agent attempts to determine the optimal action to take given
the true state which is based on the true trust model of the environment. In a fully
observable world, the agent would know where it is at and who it could trust. In a
partially observable world, the agent must estimate these values.
At a given time step, an agent calculates the expected reward for each of its
potential actions from each of its possible states. The agent selects the action with
the highest estimated reward. After taking the selected action, the agent observes the
changes in the environment and the actions of the other agents when possible. If the
actions of the other agents provide indications of their trust level, the agent updates its
trust model accordingly. Finally, after observing the changed environment, the agent
updates its state belief model based on its current trust model before attempting
to decide on its next action. Figure 3.1 illustrates the cycle of events during the
TI-POMDP execution.
The trust model, τ , is a component of the state belief and is updated based on
the observations prior to the state belief update. The agent updates its trust model
and then updates its state belief distribution.
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In the trust model update, if agent a observes agent b commit an untrustworthy
act, agent a reduces its trust rating of agent b based on the rules of the trust modeling
representation used (ie. trust vectors [17] or reputation based [24]). Using the binary
trust model, agent a reduces agent b’s trust rating from 1 to 0. Additionally, if agent
a believes agent c also observed agent b’s action, agent a lowers its estimate of agent
c’s trust rating of b from 1 to 0. The overall effect is that agent a places less trust
in agent b and agent a believes that agent c also lowers its trust in agent b. Agent a
uses this trust model in future interactions to decide whether to interact with agent
b and to estimate how agent c interacts with agent b. The new trust model and the
observations about the new state are required for the state belief update which then
restarts the process.
The primary reason to separate the trust model update is to increase the flexibil-
ity of the trust model. Handling the trust model update separately allows the under-
lying trust model to change without impacting the rest of the TI-POMDP framework.
The trust model update must provide the agent’s current trust ratings of itself, its
ratings of the other agents, and the other agent’s ratings of all of the agents. A vector
trust model [17], a reputation based trust model [22, 24], a multidimensional trust
model [18], or another trust model can be implemented to return the appropriate
ratings as needed. This allows model selection based on applicability to the domain.
The ability to use different trust models creates the problem of selecting the
appropriate model for a given domain. Comparison testing can determine which
model performs best in a specific domain. A more general solution is to implement
separate models in parallel and use a decision process to dynamically choose which
model to use at a given time [26].
The second reason to update the trust model separately from the state belief
update is to reduce the combinatorics of the state belief update. Including the trust
model as a complete component of the state multiplies the number of states by the
total number of possible trust models an agent can have. In a basic two agent envi-
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ronment where agents are either completely trustworthy or completely untrustworthy,
that state space is multiplied by an agent’s potential ratings of itself, potential rat-
ings of the other agents, and potential ratings of the other agent’s ratings of every
other agent. In this case, the state space is needlessly multiplied by a factor of eight.
The agent knows its true trust rating and the other trust ratings are based on prior
knowledge and experience. Instead of trying to estimate those values, an agent can
use its knowledge to focus on making the best possible decision at the current time.
The final reason to separate the trust model update is to eliminate fluctuations
in an agent’s trust model that can lead to a breakdown of trust within the system. If
an agent’s trust model is a component of its state belief probability distribution, the
agent can become extremely unpredictable or uncooperative. The purpose of the trust
model is to help the agent choose the most beneficial action for the given state. If the
trust model is a component of the state belief, the agent must find the most beneficial
action for each possible trust state, calculate the expected reward for each action
and then select the action that leads to the highest probable reward. For instance, a
trustworthy agent believes with 0.9 probability that the other agent is trustworthy in
a binary trust domain where successfully cooperating yields a reward of 10, working
alone has an associated reward of 1, and the reward for being betrayed is −100. The
agents expected reward for cooperating is 0.9∗10+0.1∗−100 = −1 while the expected
reward for working alone is 1. Given this situation, the agent always chooses to work
alone because of all the potential states, this one has the highest expected reward.
The state belief update (Equation 3.1) requires the agent incorporate its current
observations into its previous state belief in an effort to determine its current state.
The agent calculates the likelihood of making its current observations in each of the
possible states it may have reached given the distribution over the prior state(s) and
the action(s) taken. The previous state belief is then updated based on the observation
likelihoods for each state. Once a group of agents updates their state beliefs, they can
select and execute their next action. The action execution causes a state transition
and the agents receive rewards based on their new state.
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3.4 Impact of Trust
The addition of trust modeling into the I-POMDP framework results in an
increase in the overall complexity of the framework. The I-POMDP is already N-
EXP complete [21] without the trust model. Adding the trust model multiplies the
state space by the trust model space. The size of the trust model space is based on
the number of unique trust levels an agent can have and the number of agents in the
domain. A single agent must rate every agent in the environment including itself (n
ratings). It must also account for the other agent’s (n − 1 agents) ratings of every
other agent (n − 1 agents). Agent i does not have to account for agent j’s rating of
agent j since it would already match agent i’s rating of agent j. In all, a single agent’s
trust model contains n + (n− 1)2 ratings. Since each individual rating can take one
of the m possible trust levels, there are a total of mn+(n−1)
2
possible permutations of
an agent’s trust model.
This complexity increase is one reason for handling the trust model updates sep-
arately from the state belief updates as described in Section 3.3. Instead of computing
the probability distribution for the number of potential states multiplied mn+(n−1)
2
,
we can run a single linear update to the trust model and then compute the probability
distribution for just the number of states.
3.5 Summary
The TI-POMDP framework is introduced, creating a multi-agent environment
where an agent’s actions are influenced by its perception of the trustworthiness of the
other agents. The framework is an extension of an I-POMDP with the same basic
components (State, Action, Transition, Observations, and Rewards) plus the trust
model. The TI-POMDP updates the trust models based on current observations
and then updates the state beliefs based on the trust models and the observations.
Although the components of the TI-POMDP require exponential time to solve opti-
mally, the framework provides the benefit of incorporating another agent’s intentions
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into an agent’s decision model. This opens a wider range of agent interactions giving
agents the ability to perform more complex tasks.
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IV. TI-POMDP Testing
The TI-POMDP framework described in Chapter III defines a multi-agent envi-ronment that models agent interactions based on trust. This chapter describes
the simulation and the experiments used for testing the TI-POMDP. The simula-
tion represents a base defense scenario with agents cooperating to destroy attackers.
While a full TI-POMDP framework is used to model the agents in the environment,
several assumptions are made to reduce computational complexity of the agents and
limit testing to just the TI-POMDP reasoning component. The testing on the sim-
ulation includes an analysis to identify factors affecting algorithm output, algorithm
performance testing that measures total execution time, and comparison testing with
another trust model.
4.1 Scenario
The TI-POMDP framework can be applied to a wide range of multi-agent prob-
lems. Agents can use the framework to decide whether to infiltrate a building based
on their level of trust in the reconnaissance agents relaying guard locations. An au-
tomated call center decides to reroute its call load to an idle center that it trusts
to handle the calls. A robotic lawn mower may use the framework to decide when
to help another robot mow its area based on whether its trusts the other robot to
reciprocate. The TI-POMDP is applicable in environments where task completion
can benefit from agent cooperation.
The TI-POMDP Simulation Defender focuses on a group of agents working to-
gether to defend an installation from attackers. When an attacker is identified, a sub-
set of the agents are tasked to destroy the attacker. Each agent must decide whether
to cooperate with the other tasked agents based on its individual goals (maximize
reward) and the amount of trust it has in the other agents. The defense scenario is
selected because it provides an environment capable of utilizing multiple agent types,
a wide range of actions, and a variety of observation and reward functions. While
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these aspects only have a few settings currently, future work can utilize this large
domain.
After each task is completed, the agents try to identify the motives and alle-
giances of the other agents to help refine their trust models of the other agents. The
refined trust models are used in future decisions.
4.2 Implementation
The framework can be implemented on robotic hardware or simulation software
and is not language dependent. A Java-based simulation is used to allow portability
between systems. The simulation is a visual depiction of the agents operating in the
environment. The environment consists of a simple building with two doors as shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.2 depicts the major components of the simulation. The Environment
Controller is an “Eye in the Sky” overseeing the creation and execution of the simula-
tion, but not actively visible in the environment. Attackers and agents move through
the environment. A TI-POMDP is used to model the agents, govern their action
decisions, and distribute rewards. The primary functions and responsibilities of each
component are as follows:
4.2.1 Environment Controller. An Environment Controller initially creates
and randomly distributes a set number of Agents in the space. During the simulation,
the Environment Controller creates and randomly distributes a set number of Attack-
ers along the perimeter of the simulation space. The number of active Attackers at
any given time is limited by a threshold set prior to running the simulation. When the
number of Attackers reaches the threshold limit, the Environment Controller waits
until an Attacker is destroyed before it creates a new Attacker. When it creates an
Attacker, the Environment Controller creates a task and assigns the task to a random
group of agents. This allows the simulation to focus on the interactions between the
Agents, not the sensor capabilities of the Agents and the task distribution process.
32
Figure 4.1: An image of the Defender Simulation with three
Agents and one Attacker.
Figure 4.2: The major components in the trust simulation.
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This also eliminates a potential trust exploitation where an Agent assigns false tasks
to trustworthy Agents. The number of Agents assigned to each Attacker is random.
Agents without prior task commitments are assigned first. If necessary, Agents with
prior task commitments are assigned. Agents complete the tasks in the order they
arrive to eliminate starvation.
The Environment Controller maintains the current reward level for the active
tasks. The reward level based on whether previous actions were successfully completed
via cooperation. The number of reward levels is equal to the number of Agent trust
levels (set prior to simulation) minus one. If the simulation has three trust levels,
then each action can have either level 1 or level 2 rewards. If Agents successfully
cooperate with a level 1 reward, the next action has a level 2 reward. Higher reward
levels do not change the number of assigned Agents.
The Environment Controller does not maintain trust ratings on the Agents,
assign Agents based on their past performance, or attempt to maximize expected
utility of the task. This forces the individual Agents to track and reason about the
trustworthiness of the other Agents in the environment. If the Environment Controller
tracked the trust ratings of the Agents, it would not assign untrustworthy agents to
tasks, resulting in their isolation. While this action is desired in most scenarios, it
reduces the simulation’s testing ability of the TI-POMDP framework. When known
untrustworthy Agents are assigned to a task, the other Agents tailor their actions to
isolate the untrustworthy Agents and mitigate the damage they cause.
4.2.2 Attackers. Attackers are created at the edge of the environment and
attempt to move toward the center. Since Attackers are not modeled by the TI-
POMDP, they do not receive rewards for reaching the center. The Attackers are
enemies with an initial strength of 100. Once an Attacker’s strength is depleted it is
rendered useless, removed from the environment, and the task of the Agent’s assigned
to defeat the Attacker is complete.
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4.2.3 Agents. Agents have two mutually exclusive tasks, patrolling the
environment and defeating Attackers. The patrolling behavior consists of randomly
wandering the environment. Once assigned to a defense task, Agents engage and
destroy the Attacker before returning to their patrol duties.
The motion of individual Agents and Attackers is controlled by a behavior-based
architecture [5]. An Agent’s behavior set consists of random walking and going to a
target. The specific behavior is determined by the task assigned to the Agent. All
tasks include the wall following and obstacle avoidance behaviors to help maneuver
through the environment.
Only Agents assigned to a particular task are able to affect that task. If an
unassigned Agent is in the vicinity of the Attacker, it will not engage the Attacker.
This focuses the trust analysis just on the team of Agents assigned to the task.
The Agents do not have to worry about an outside Agent hindering their ability to
complete the task. Unassigned Agents may observe the actions of assigned Agents
and update their trust model accordingly.
An Agent decreases the Attacker’s strength by 25 points every time it chooses
to attack the Attacker. The attack power of 25 points is used to ensure groups of
one or two Agents must engage the Attacker multiple times since it has a strength of
100. A larger group of Agents (four or more) can eliminate the Attacker after a single
engagement. Each action is a single attack by each of Agents assigned to the task.
When an Agent decides to betray another Agent, it adds 15 points to the Attacker’s
strength. The addition to the Attacker’s strength prolongs the engagement but does
not completely counteract another Agent’s action.
Depending on the number of Agents involved and their actions, each engagement
has a unique duration. In the case where two cooperating Agents engage a single at-
tacker, each Agent depletes 25 points from the Attacker. After the two Agents engage
the Attacker a second time, the Attacker is eliminated with each Agent responsible
for 50 points versus a single Agent taking 4 rounds and 100 points. If a cooperating
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Agent and a betraying Agent engage an Attacker, the cooperating Agent depletes 25
points from the Attacker, and the betraying Agent adds 15 points for a net change of
−10. Two betraying Agents add 30 to the Attackers strength.
4.2.4 TI-POMDP. The TI-POMDP framework is updated when a task is
first identified and Agents are assigned to it. Each Agent uses the decision policy to
decide which action to take. After action execution, the TI-POMDP framework is
updated based on the observations. Figure 3.1 illustrates the TI-POMDP decision
cycle. The TI-POMDP consists of the interactive states, actions, transition function,
observation function, and reward function.
The domain’s interactive state consists of the Agent’s trust model,the task level,
and which Agents are assigned to a task. This is the smallest possible state for this
domain (as opposed to including Agent locations and any other environmental factor).
This size reduction allows the simulation and testing to focus on the uncertainty of
the trust model rather than the uncertainty created by the environment.
The Agent’s action set includes “cooperating,” “working alone,” “betraying,”
“concealing,” or “redeeming” actions. Their choice of action depends on their trust
model. An untrustworthy Agent chooses to “betray” or “conceal” while a trustworthy
Agent chooses to “cooperate,” “work alone,” or “redeem.”
• Trustworthy Agents choosing to “cooperate” diminish an Attacker’s strength
by 25 points. “Cooperating” Agents assume that the other assigned Agents will
diminish an Attacker’s strength by their share.
• Trustworthy Agents choosing to “work alone” also diminish an Attacker’s strength
by 25 points. Agents “working alone” assume that the other assigned Agents
will not diminish an Attacker’s strength and may try to increase the Attacker’s
strength. They expect the engagement to last longer.
• Untrustworthy Agents choosing to “betray” always add 15 points to the At-
tacker’s strength.
36
• Untrustworthy Agents choosing to “conceal” always diminish an Attacker’s
strength by 0.1 points. This action allows a “concealing” Agent to act like
it is helping so unassigned Agents cannot determine an accurate trust rating.
The 0.1 decrease is used to prevent deadlock if a group of “concealing” Agents
are assigned to an Attacker since they eventually reduce the Attacker’s strength
to 0.
• Trustworthy Agents choosing to “redeem” have the same effect as cooperating
Agents, but are making a conscientious decision to work with Agents that do
not trust them. This exposes the Agent to potential betrayal as the Agent
selects a course of action that has a lower immediate expected reward (versus
working alone). “Redeeming” Agents are formerly untrustworthy Agents trying
to reestablish their reputation among the other Agents.
The transition function maps one state to the next based on the Agent’s actions.
The transition function first updates the individual Agent trust models based on the
their actions. At this point, each Agent has a probability of being corrupted or
redeemed based on their actual trust level. The probability of an Agent’s trust level
changing is governed by the corruption and redemption rates given at the start of the
simulation. The rates do not change during the simulation execution. Both rates can
range from 0.0 (never corrupted or redeemed) to 1.0 (always corrupted or redeemed)
and the two rates can be adjusted independently of one another. If the corruption rate
is 0.1 and the redemption rate is 0.3 a trustworthy Agent has a 10 percent chance of
becoming more untrustworthy while an untrustworthy Agent has a 30 percent chance
of becoming more trustworthy. If an Agent is somewhere between trustworthy and
untrustworthy, there is a 0.05 probability (0.5 ∗ 0.1) of becoming less trustworthy and
a 0.15 probability (0.5 ∗ 0.3) of becoming more trustworthy. An Agent knows when
its trust rating changes, but the other Agents are not aware of the change. The final
step of the transition function adds new tasks, removes completed tasks, and sets the
reward level for the next action.
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The observation function is a probabilistic model of what actions a given Agent
sees within the environment and is tied to the actions Agents take on a task. Agents
assigned to a task are guaranteed to observe the actions of the other Agents assigned
to the same task. Unassigned Agents may observe “cooperating,” “betraying,” and
“redeeming” actions according to a set probability (0.5), but they can not observe
the difference between “working alone” and “concealing” actions. Unassigned Agent
observations are based on probability instead of location with respect to the task so the
unassigned Agents are not rewarded (by receiving better observations) for neglecting
their patrol duties.
The reward function is a distribution based on the collective actions of all Agents
assigned to a specific task. Each Agent receives its reward based on its individual
action with respect to the actions of the team that assigned to the task. The reward
function used in the simulation is based on the Tiger Game reward function [7, 13].
The reward function is designed to value successful “cooperation” and “betrayal”,
penalize unsuccessful “cooperation” and “betrayal”, and allow the safe options of
“work alone” and “conceal.”
• Agents that “work alone” or “conceal” always receive a reward of −1 regardless
of the other Agent’s action choices.
• If all Agents “cooperate,” “work alone,” or “redeem,” the reward for the Agents
that “cooperate” and “redeem” is 10 ∗ t2, where t is the current reward level as
set by the Environment Controller.
• If all Agents “cooperate” or “redeem” except for a single “betray” Agent, the
“betray” Agent receives a reward of 10 ∗ t2 while the other Agents receive a
reward of −100.
• If multiple Agents “betray,” all “cooperate,” “betray,” and “redeem” Agents
receive a reward of −100. The “betray” Agents receive the negative reward
because they betrayed each other.
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• If a “betray” Agent is not paired with at least one “cooperate” Agent, the
“betray” Agent receives a reward of -100.
The reward level effects the potential reward of a successful cooperation or
betrayal on the task. An Agent’s trust model is composed of the highest reward
level that it believes every other Agent is willing to “cooperate” at. If Agent a’s trust
model indicates that Agent b is trustworthy at a reward level of 3, then Agent a trusts
Agent b when the reward level is 3 or less and does not trust Agent b at higher levels.
Figure 4.3 shows the changes in trusted reward levels as Agents cooperate and
compete with each other. Agent 2’s betrayal level limits the amount of cooperation
between the Agents and indirectly causes Agent 1’s trust level of Agent 2 to change.
Agent 2’s betrayal level changes due to random corruption or redemption caused by
the environment. Initially, Agent 1 trusts Agent 2 up to level 10, but Agent 2 is
actually only trustworthy up to level 6. Once Agent 2 “betrays” Agent 1 (Action 6),
Agent 1’s trust level changes to level 6. Agent 1 is unaware that Agent 2’s betrayal
level changed after Action 6, allowing the “betrayal” at Action 9 which results in
Agent 1 lowering its trust level of Agent 2 to level 3. Since Agent 1 no longer trusts
Agent 2, it “works alone” (Action 12) the next time it encounters an action with a
reward level of 3 which resets the reward level to 0. Agent 2 “redeems” itself (Action
15) after its betrayal level changed. Agent 1 revises its trust level in response to the
redemption.
Assuming the Agents only look at the next action, their decision process focuses
on maximizing the reward for the next action. To decide whether to cooperate, each
Agent reviews its trust model of the other Agents assigned to the task as well as it own
trust rating. If the Agent is trustworthy at the current reward level and trusts the
other Agents at the current reward level, it chooses to “cooperate.” If a trustworthy
Agent does not trust another assigned Agent or does not believe that another Agent
trusts one of the assigned Agents, it chooses to “work alone.” An untrustworthy
Agent attempts to “betray” the other Agents if it believes they are all trustworthy
39
Figure 4.3: Trust interactions between agents.
and that they trust it. Once the Agent “betrays” (Actions 6, 9, and 22), the other
Agents update their trust models by reducing their level of trust in the “betraying”
Agent. Otherwise, an untrustworthy Agent will “conceal” its actions. If the Agent
chooses to “conceal” its actions, it does not help with the task, but it does not hinder
it either. The “conceal” action is not shown in this figure because only two Agents
are in the domain which eliminates the utility of the action. Agents can benefit from
“concealing” in larger domains because the other Agents can not differentiate between
“conceal” and “working alone” allowing the untrustworthy Agent to potentially betray
in the future.
There is an additional case where a trustworthy Agent does not believe the other
Agents trust it. This Agent will choose to “redeem” itself (Action 15) and cooperate
on the task, knowing that it is likely to sustain a penalty since it is doubtful that the
other Agents are planning on cooperating with it. This sacrificial action “redeems”
the Agent, causing the other Agents to update their trust models by increasing their
level of trust in the “redeemed” Agent and deciding to “cooperate” with it on future
tasks.
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After the Agents act, all Agents within the environment update their individual
trust models based on their observations of the task. The Agents directly involved
with the task are guaranteed to observe the actions (other than the difference between
“work alone” and “conceal”) of the other task participants. Model updates are more
complex for Agents not assigned to the task. If an unassigned Agent does not observe
the task at all, it can not determine which Agent took what action. If an unassigned
Agent does observe the task, it will know if another Agent “cooperates,” “betrays,”
or “redeems” and updates its model accordingly. Assigned Agents update their trust
models of the unassigned Agents based on their probability of observing the task. This
can lead to situations where one Agent incorrectly believes another Agent observed a
betrayal which skews the first Agent’s future expectation.
4.2.5 Decision Policy Calculation. Prior to execution, the TI-POMDP
requires a decision policy as defined in Section 2.2. The decision policy defines what
action to take in a given state. Since decision policies are domain specific, solving the
optimal or approximately optimal policy for a given domain is ideal. The decision
policy for the Defender simulation is discovered through policy iteration [20] with the
aid of behavioral equivalence [16] and alpah-beta minimax pruning [20].
The first step in the decision policy discovery is using behavioral equivalence
to reduce the number of different states. Behavioral equivalence maps similar states
onto one another. Rather than finding a decision for every one of these states, a single
decision can be used for all of the similar states. The simplest method of behavioral
equivalence in the Defender simulation is to collapse the states into eight states. The
eight states are as follows:
• Trustworthy Agent that believes the other assigned Agents are trustworthy and
they trust each other.
• Trustworthy Agent that believes it is not trusted by at least one other assigned
Agent.
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• Trustworthy Agent that believes the other assigned Agents are trustworthy but
do not trust each other.
• Trustworthy Agent that does not trust at least one other assigned Agent.
• Untrustworthy Agent that believes the other assigned Agents are trustworthy
and they trust each other.
• Untrustworthy Agent that believes it is not trusted by at least one other assigned
Agent.
• Untrustworthy Agent that believes the other assigned Agents are trustworthy
but do not trust each other.
• Untrustworthy Agent that does not trust at least one other assigned Agent.
These eight states are multiplied by the number of reward levels since the de-
cision policy may be different depending on the reward level. In a domain with two
reward levels, every state fits into at least one of the 16 equivalence states. The equiv-
alence states are listed in order of precedence. As an example, a trustworthy Agent
may believe that it is not trusted by another Agent (equivalence state 2) and not
trust at least one other assigned Agent (equivalence state 4). In this case the state is
grouped into equivalence state 2.
Once the equivalence states are determined the policy iteration begins. The
policy iteration conducts a series of runs of the simulation starting from one of the
equivalence states. Each run consists of five action decisions with the cumulative
reward after the fifth decision tracked. A five percent decay rate is used in the future
reward calculation.
Initially, each equivalence state is run twenty times for each of the allowable
actions for that state. If an untrustworthy Agent is not allowed to take a specific
action (an untrustworthy Agent cannot “cooperate,” “work alone,” or “redeem”), the
equivalence states with an untrustworthy Agent do not select that action. The other
Agents in the environment select a random action from the allowable actions in the
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current state. After the state transition and belief update, the simulation conducts
four additional decisions and updates. The additional decisions are all random.
After twenty runs of the same initial decision, the average cumulative reward
is stored as the expected reward for that initial decision. Once all of the possible
initial decisions are run for an equivalence state, the initial decision with the highest
expected reward is stored as the desired decision for that state. The initial decision
policy consists the desired decisions for every equivalence state.
The process is repeated using the initial decision policy. For each equivalence
state twenty runs are conducted using the initial decision policy and ten runs are
conducted for each allowable action from the equivalence state with a random decision
policy for the four additional decisions. An equivalence state with two possible actions
requires 40 runs during this step (20 with the decision policy, 10 with the first action
and a randomized policy and 10 with the second action and randomized policy). The
runs with the randomized policy are used to explore the reward space. To reduce
the required computation, alpha-beta minimax is used to prune dominated runs that
use the randomized policy. If a run using the randomized policy cannot achieve the
expected reward of the decision policy after 2, 3, or 4 decisions the run is stopped
instead of continuing to a suboptimal end. The maximum possible reward (the highest
reward it could achieve by successfully cooperating for the remainder of the run) is
used in the average expected reward calculation.
At the end of the runs, the initial decision (either from the decision policy or
the randomized runs) with the highest expected reward becomes the desired decision
for the next decision policy. If the desired decision for an equivalence state does
not change from one iteration to the next, the number of additional runs using the
randomized policy is reduced by one half during the next iteration of that equivalence
state. Once the number of additional runs using the randomized policy is less than 2,
the decision for that equivalence state is complete. This decision becomes the decision
policy for that equivalence state.
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Figure 4.4: An Agent’s decision transitions.
Figure 4.4 shows the potential progression of an Agent’s trust model (circles)
and actions (arrows) through a series of time steps. The actions also serve as tran-
sitions between trust models which are probabilistic as outlined in Table 4.1. The
probabilities are based on the corruption/redemption rate of the environment and
the progression of Agent actions. In an environment with a corruption/redemption
rate of 0.1, a Trustworthy/Trusting Agent has a 10 percent chance of becoming un-
trustworthy (transitioning to model 3 or 4) and a 90 percent chance of remaining
trustworthy (transitioning to model 1 or 2). The probability of actually transitioning
to 1 versus transitioning to 2 is based on the Agent actions. In an environment with
a low corruption/redemption rate, the Agents are more likely to remaining trustwor-
thy and trusting of others (1 to 1 transition). As the corruption/redemption rate
increases, the Agents are more likely to not trust each other (1 to 2 transition). A 3
to 3 transition is always unlikely because once an Agent “betrays,” it usually can not
benefit from repeating that action.
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Table 4.1: Probability of trust model transitions
based on corruption/redemption rate. Model 1 is
Trustworthy/Trusting. Model 2 is Trustworthy/Not
Trusting. Model 3 is Untrustworthy/Trusting. Model
4 is Untrustworthy/Not Trusting. Model 5 is Trust-
worthy/Not Trusted.
Corruption/
Transitions Redemption Rate
0.1 0.3 0.5
1 to 1 0.72 0.28 0.05
1 to 2 0.18 0.42 0.45
1 to 3 0.08 0.12 0.05
1 to 4 0.02 0.18 0.45
2 to 1 0.036 0.042 0.045
2 to 2 0.864 0.658 0.455
2 to 3 0.004 0.018 0.045
2 to 4 0.096 0.282 0.455
3 to 3 0.009 0.007 0.005
3 to 4 0.891 0.693 0.495
3 to 5 0.10 0.30 0.50
4 to 3 0.009 0.042 0.045
4 to 4 0.891 0.658 0.455
4 to 5 0.10 0.30 0.50
The Agent is initially trustworthy and trusts the other Agents so it decides to
“cooperate.” Depending on the results of its action, the Agent can reach one of four
new trust models. If the Agent was “betrayed” by another during the last task, the
Agent remains trustworthy, but no longer trusts at least one other Agent. The Agent
transitions to the leftmost node of the second row and chooses to “work alone” on
the next task involving the untrusted Agents. This transition occurs with probability
of 0.18, 0.18, and 0.45 in environments with corruption rates of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5
respectively. If the previous task was successful, the Agent’s trust model stays the
same which leads the Agent to “cooperate” on future tasks. This trust model is
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represented by the left-center node of the second row. This transition occurs with
probability of 0.72, 0.12, and 0.05 in environments with corruption rates of 0.1, 0.3,
and 0.5 respectively.
There is also a probability that the Agent becomes corrupted after an action. If
the Agent was “betrayed” by another during the last task and the Agent is corrupted,
the Agent transitions to being untrustworthy and does not trust at least one other
Agent (rightmost node of the second row). The Agent’s action choice for this trust
model is to “conceal.” This transition occurs with probability of 0.02, 0.42, and
0.45 in environments with corruption rates of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 respectively. If the
last task was successful and the Agent is corrupted, the Agent transitions to being
untrustworthy while still trusting the other Agents (right-center node of the second
row). The Agent chooses to “betray” for this trust model. This transition occurs
with probability of 0.08, 0.28, and 0.05 in environments with corruption rates of 0.1,
0.3, and 0.5 respectively.
These same transitions occur from each of the four trust models with one excep-
tion. If an untrustworthy Agent (either trusting of others or not) is redeemed, that
Agent transitions to a model where it is trustworthy but not trusted by the other
Agents. This model resembles the initial model where the Agent is trustworthy, but
the Agent chooses to “redeem” itself regardless of whether it trusts the other Agents
in the environment. The probability of transitioning to this trust model is equal to
the redemption rate of the environment.
In the simulation Agents look further ahead than just the next action and at-
tempt to maximize their expected reward for a certain number of actions into the fu-
ture. The simulation explores five actions ahead to limit the search space and reduce
the time required to create the model. This look ahead can cause an untrustworthy
Agent to “conceal” in an effort to increase the reward level for a future betrayal. On
the other hand, a trustworthy Agent that currently trusts the other assigned Agents
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may decide to “work alone” simply because the model has determined that betrayals
are likely to occur at the current reward level.
4.3 Design of Experiments
Three tests are used to evaluate the performance of the TI-POMDP framework.
The first test focuses on the impact of the various simulation settings (number of
Agents, number of reward levels, etc.) on the response variables within the framework.
The second test measures the change simulation run time as the number of agents
involved increases. The final test compares the TI-POMDP framework with the trust
vector [17] modeling approach.
The tests are conducted in two separate environments. In the first environment,
a single agent can overcome a betrayal and still eventually complete the task. This
allows the test to proceed. In the second environment agents can not directly overcome
betrayal. As soon as the Agents discover a betrayal, they call for help from other
trusted agents to deal with the attacker and complete the task. The call for help is
a call to the Environment Controller to add an unassigned agent to the task. The
second environment demonstrates an Agent’s ability to use its trust model to overcome
“betrayals” by adding additional Agents to the task.
4.3.1 Factorial Test. The first test is designed to identify which simulation
settings have the largest impact on the output of the simulation. Each setting that
can be changed in the simulation is called a factor. As the settings are adjusted the
change in output values of the simulation is measured. Significant changes in output
values indicate that the factor has a significant affect on the simulation.
The test is based on a factorial design with mixed level factors [14]. This
means that each factor tested has two or more possible settings. An Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) is used to determine the level of contribution each factor has on
the performance of the simulation and define a regression model for predicting the
response value for various factor settings.
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The first design step is to identify factors, their ranges, and specific levels. The
second step is to identify the desired response variable. The final design step is
creating the specific experiment design.
The simulation factors include:
• Number of Agents: the number of Agents operating within the environment.
This test uses 3, 4, and 5.
• Mix of Agent: the simulation has three separate Agent mixes. In the first, all
Agents have the same probability of corruption and redemption. In the second
mix, the Agents are split into two groups where the second group is 10 percent
more likely to be corrupted or redeemed than the first. In the final mix, there
are three groups of Agents. The second group is 10 percent more likely to be
corrupted or redeemed and the third group of the Agents is 20 percent more
likely to be corrupted or redeemed than the first group. This test uses all three
settings.
• Number of Reward Levels: the number of different reward levels an action can
have. This test uses 2, 3, and 4.
• Probability of Corruption: the probability that a given Agent becomes more cor-
rupt every time the transition function occurs. This test uses settings between
0.05 and 0.5 at increments of 0.05.
• Probability of Redemption: the probability that a given Agent becomes less cor-
rupt every time the transition function occurs. This test uses settings between
0.05 and 0.5 at increments of 0.05.
Each test run sets each factor to a specific level (for instance 3 Agents, Agent
complexity at 2, 4 reward levels, corruption rate at 0.2, and redemption rate at 0.45).
These levels do not change for the entire test run and all combinations of levels are
tested in a single replication. The factor levels are designed to fully evaluate the
factor impact within the specific range while still providing insight into the impact of
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factor settings outside of the tested range (7 Agents or 10 reward levels). Limiting
the number of Agents to 5 avoids the time required to calculate the decision policy
for 6 or more agents. Limiting the corruption and redemption rates to 0.5 avoids the
highly fluctuating environments where Agents cannot predict future trust values.
The experiment limits Probability of Corruption and Probability of Redemption
to the lower end of their potential values because higher values result in rapid changes
in Agent trustworthiness. These rapid changes greatly degrade system performance,
resulting in a situation where Agents no longer trust one another.
The potential response variables include
• Reward Value: the average reward achieved by each Agent.
• Number of “Cooperates”: the number of times an Agent chooses to “cooperate.”
• Number of Successful “Cooperates”: the number times an Agent chooses to
“cooperate” and receives its expected reward versus the total number of times
an Agent chooses to “cooperate.”
Reward value is the primary response variable tracked since it measures the
overall Agent performance. The two percentages are also tracked since they give
insight into an Agent’s decision process. “Betray,” “redeem,” “work alone,” and
“conceal” can be substituted for “cooperate” in the two percentages as well.
Based on 3 settings of number of Agents, 3 reward levels, 3 Agents mixes,
10 corruption rates, and 10 redemption rates, a full factorial matrix includes 2700
separate test cases. The two test environments (Agents can overcome “betrayal” and
Agents must call for help) result in 5400 unique test cases. Running each case 2 times
results in a total of 10800 individual test runs. Each test run for this experiment
consists of the group of Agents completing 50 tasks.
According to Montgomery’s sample size determination method [14], this size of
test has an Type I Error of 0.05 and a Type II Error of 0.01 assuming a response vari-
able standard deviation to noise ratio of 2:1 or less. This means there is a probability
49
of 0.05 that this test will fail to identify an influential factor and a probability of 0.01
that this test will falsely identify a non influential factor as influential.
Statistica™is used to conduct the ANOVA. ANOVA compares the sum of squares
of the factors with the sum of squares of the error to determine which factors influence
the response variable. The ultimate goal of the test is to be able to predict how Agents
perform in a given environment.
4.3.2 Performance Test. The performance test measures simulation execu-
tion time as the number of Agents increases. The amount of time required by the
simulation increases as the number of Agents increases (the domain becomes more
complex). This increase is the result of a more complex decision policy model and a
larger number of Agents making decisions.
This test monitors the time required for a group of Agents to complete 50 tasks.
Group size will be the only variable between test runs with groups ranging from 3 to
10 Agents. Each group size is run 10 times to determine an average time required to
complete 50 tasks.
4.3.3 Comparison Test. The final set of tests is a direct comparison of
action success rates between the TI-POMDP framework and a trust vector modeling
approach [17]. Two types of comparison tests are used. The first test is a modified
version of the Tiger Game introduced by Kaelbling [13] and expanded into a multi-
agent game by Doshi [7] while the second test uses the Defender simulation.
In the multi-agent Tiger Game, two agents must choose which of two doors to
open. Opening one door provides a reward while the other frees a tiger that penalizes
the agent. Agents may open the left door, open the right door, or listen. Listening
has a probability (0.85) of correctly hearing which door hides the tiger. Opening a
door resets the location of the tiger and the reward, starts a new game, and results
in a squeak that lets the other agent know the game was reset.
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The multi-agent Tiger Game is modified into the Cooperative Tiger Game
(CTG). In the CTG both agents must cooperate to open the door with the reward.
Every time the agents cooperate, the reward value doubles for the next game. One
agent can betray the other by opening the tiger door when the other agent tries to
open the reward door. The betraying agent receives double the reward value while
the betrayed agent is penalized. An agent that believes the other agent is going to
betray him can reset the reward back to its original level. Agent trust levels can
fluctuate which changes the probability that one agent will betray another. Agents
communicate prior to each turn to reach a non-binding agreement on which action
to take. The CTG test uses a 0.05 probability of an agent becoming more corrupt or
more trustworthy.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the state transition process an agent undergoes. It does
not include the belief model update the agent uses to transition between Trusting and
Not Trusting beliefs. It is important to note that the Not Trusting belief applies if the
agent has been corrupted or the agent believes the other agent has been corrupted.
In either situation, the agent chooses to open door with the tiger to maximize its
reward.
The Defender simulation comparison testing has a group of Agents complete 50
tasks using either the TI-POMDP framework or a trust vector model as its action
decision process. In addition, the TI-POMDP framework is tested with a 5 action
horizon and a next action horizon.
The Defender simulation tests are conducted with three number of Agents set-
tings (3, 4, and 5), three reward level settings (2, 3, and 4), the three mix of Agents
settings, and three corruption/redemption rates (0.1, 0.3, and 0.5). There are two
complete replications of these setting combinations. The average reward, number of
cooperations, success rate of cooperations, number of betrayals, and success rate of
betrayals are used to compare the models.
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Figure 4.5: The state-action-observation transitions for the
Cooperative Tiger Game.
4.4 Summary
Agents use individual trust models to decide how to interact with each other.
When possible Agents attempt to benefit from cooperative actions while minimiz-
ing their vulnerability to betrayal. The Defender Simulation represents a trust-based
multi-agent environment. The simulation provides a tailorable environment that can
be applied to wide range of problems. The outlined testing for this simulation ex-
amines the impact of the simulation settings, the performance of the TI-POMDP
framework, and the compares the TI-POMDP framework to the trust vector model.
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V. Results and Analysis
The testing outlined in Section 4.3 is designed to evaluate the performance andcapabilities of the Defender Simulation and the TI-POMDP framework. The
testing includes an analysis of the simulation settings that affect the TI-POMDP
results, an estimate of the TI-POMDP performance, and a comparison of the TI-
POMDP with a trust vector model. This chapter presents the results of those tests
and an analysis of the associated capabilities of the TI-POMDP.
5.1 Factorial Test Results
The factorial test is designed to illustrate how five separate factors (number of
agents, types of agents, number of trust levels, probability of corrupting an agent, and
probability of redeeming an agent) impact the five response variables (average reward,
number of successful “cooperates,” total number of “cooperates,” number of successful
“betrays,” and “total number of “betrays”). The test includes two replications of a
full factorial test design [14] with a randomized test run order. The full factorial test
is conducted in both the basic and complex task environments. The results for the
factorial test are divided by response variables.
ANOVA is the primary analytical tool for this test. ANOVA relies on the Sum
of Squares to calculate the F statistic for the level of contribution of each factor. For
instance, in this test the Number of Agents has three different settings (3, 4, and 5
agents) and each test run uses one of these settings. The Sum of Squares due to the
treatment (SSTR) is
n
a∑
i=1
(ȳi· − ȳ··)2, (5.1)
where
• a is the number of factor levels, in this case 3.
• n is the number of samples taken at each factor level.
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• ȳi· is the mean of all samples with the same factor setting (when a = 1, this is
all samples with 3 agents).
• ȳ·· is the grand mean of all samples.
The SSTR for the Number of Agents is compared to the unexplained variance
or error associated with the data. The error is the variation of the individual data
points around ȳi·. The Sum of Squares estimate of the total error (SSE) is
a∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(yij − ȳi·)2, (5.2)
where
• a, n, and ȳi· are the same as Equation 5.1.
• yij is an individual data point.
The Mean Square Due to Treatment (MSTR) is
SSTR
a− 1 , (5.3)
and the Mean Square Due to Error (MSE) is
SSE
N − a, (5.4)
where N is the total number of samples (usually a ∗ n).
The a−1 in MSTR and the N−a in MSE are the number of degrees of freedom
required to calculate those statistics. The F statistic for a treatment is the ratio
F0 =
MSTR
MSE
. (5.5)
As the ratio approaches 1, the MSTR becomes analogous to MSE which means
the treatment has no discernible affect on the outcome data. If the MSTR is signifi-
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cantly larger than the MSE, the treatment is considered to impact the outcome data.
Significance is determined by the F statistic. Figure 5.1 shows the various compo-
nents used to calculate the Sum of Squares. In this figure, the factor settings are the
different levels of a given factor (for instance number of Agents at 3, 4, 5, and 6), the
grand mean is the average of all of the individual samples, and the group means are
the averages of the individual samples at a specific factor setting. The variance due
to treatment is the difference between the grand mean and each of the group means.
This represents the model variance attributed to the factor (number of Agents). The
variance of the individual samples within a group is the unexplained variance which
is either caused by another factor or is error associated with the process.
Figure 5.1: Sum of Squares Analysis components. This figure shows the compo-
nents used in a notional Sum of Squares analysis. The analysis measures the effect
of a factor with four different settings on the output response value.
5.1.1 Average Reward. Running ANOVA with average reward as the re-
sponse variable returns the Table 5.1. The chart has two entries for every factor, a
linear component and a quadratic component. In addition, the entries “Number of
Agents by Reward Levels,” “Number of Agents by Agent Mix,” etc. are interactions
between two factors. These interactions are the effect specific settings of two factors,
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such as Number of Agents and Reward Levels, have on the response variable. It can
be the case that a specific setting (say 5 agents and 4 reward levels) results in a large
change to the response variable in comparison with 3 or 4 agents and 4 reward levels
or 5 agents and 2 or 3 reward levels. The columns of the chart are the Sum of Squares,
the degrees of freedom, the Mean Square, the F statistic, and the significance value
p of the F statistic. The p value is the probability that a particular component does
not have an effect on the response variable, with values less than 0.05 signifying an
active factor.
The p values in Table 5.1 indicate that every factor and interaction is significant
except for the linear Agent Mix, the quadratic Agent Mix, and four interactions
involving Agent Mix.
5.1.1.1 Result Impact on ANOVA Assumptions. The large number of
active factors indicates that this data set may have an assumption violation. There are
four assumptions made by ANOVA (independent samples, a completely defined model,
normal distribution of residuals, and equal variance within cells). The independent
samples assumption is satisfied because the runs are collected in a randomized fashion
and each run is separate eliminating the possibility of a timing trend. The test design
ensures model completeness because only the five identified factors change from run
to run, there is not a concern that weather, time of day, or some other factor can
influence the model.
Validating the other two assumptions comes from analyzing the data. Residuals
are the difference between an expected value and the actual value. ANOVA generates
a model that predicts the response variable for a specific group of factor settings. The
difference between the predicted value and the value from the actual data points is the
residual. When plotted, normally distributed residuals look like random noise with
no discernible pattern. Figure 5.2 shows the actual residuals for each of the predicted
values from the model. The definite funneling on the left side of the graph is common
when cell variances are not equal.
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Table 5.1: Complete ANOVA with average reward as response variable.
Factor SS df MS F p
Number of Agents(L) 5.28 ∗ 1012 1 5.28 ∗ 1012 883.01 0.00
Number of Agents(Q) 1.12 ∗ 1011 1 1.12 ∗ 1011 18.71 0.00
Reward Levels(L) 1.11 ∗ 1014 1 1.11 ∗ 1014 18504.04 0.00
Reward Levels(Q) 2.58 ∗ 1013 1 2.58 ∗ 1013 4312.49 0.00
Agent Mix(L) 6.11 ∗ 109 1 6.11 ∗ 109 1.02 0.31
Agent Mix(Q) 8.26 ∗ 109 1 8.26 ∗ 109 1.38 0.24
Corruption Rate(L) 2.92 ∗ 1013 1 2.92 ∗ 1013 4886.83 0.00
Corruption Rate(Q) 3.17 ∗ 1012 1 3.17 ∗ 1012 530.20 0.00
Redemption Rate(L) 6.72 ∗ 1012 1 6.72 ∗ 1012 1123.79 0.00
Redemption Rate(Q) 5.52 ∗ 1011 1 5.52 ∗ 1011 92.32 0.00
Number of Agents(L)
by Reward Levels(L)
6.32 ∗ 1012 1 6.32 ∗ 1012 1055.57 0.00
Number of Agents(L)
by Agent Mix(L)
7.19 ∗ 109 1 7.19 ∗ 109 1.20 0.27
Number of Agents(L)
by Corruption Rate(L)
4.41 ∗ 1010 1 4.41 ∗ 1010 7.38 0.01
Number of Agents(L)
by Redemption Rate(L)
1.48 ∗ 1011 1 1.48 ∗ 1011 24.72 0.00
Reward Levels(L)
by Agent Mix(L)
9.55 ∗ 109 1 9.55 ∗ 109 1.60 0.21
Reward Levels(L)
by Corruption Rate(L)
3.53 ∗ 1013 1 3.53 ∗ 1013 5904.70 0.00
Reward Levels(L)
by Redemption Rate(L)
8.27 ∗ 1012 1 8.27 ∗ 1012 1381.49 0.00
Agent Mix(L)
by Corruption Rate(L)
1.00 ∗ 1010 1 1.00 ∗ 1010 1.67 0.20
Agent Mix(L)
by Redemption Rate(L)
8.46 ∗ 109 1 8.46 ∗ 109 1.41 0.23
Corruption Rate(L)
by Redemption Rate(L)
5.04 ∗ 1011 1 5.04 ∗ 1011 84.29 0.00
Error 3.22 ∗ 1013 5379 5.98 ∗ 109
Total SS 2.64 ∗ 1014 5399
The issue with unequal variance is that ANOVA incorrectly estimates the mean
of cells with large variances. The MSE for these cells becomes falsely small and the
mean for the cell appears to be an actual trend influencing the response variable.
57
Figure 5.2: Predicted Values vs Residual Values.
Using a contractive transform on the response variable values can pull the data
together and reduce the variance. Contractive transforms include square root and
log functions. Applying contractive transforms to the data set does not reduce the
unequal variances to an acceptable level for analysis.
Although the assumptions violation (unequal variances) can not be remedied,
analysis using resampling does not require the assumption of equal variance. Resam-
pling [9] draws repeated samples from our data set. These samples are used describe
the entire population. The only assumptions made by resampling are the model is
completely defined and the data represents the distribution of population values.
The resampling technique used in this paper breaks the factorial data set into
several subsets according to the factor settings. For instance, one subset contains all
of the test runs with 3 Agents, while another contains all the 4 Agent runs and a third
has the 5 Agent runs. Each factor is broken down in this manner with the subsets of
number of Agents, reward levels, and Agent complexity having 1800 runs each while
the corruption and redemption rate subsets have 540 runs each.
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Using the Resampling Toolkit add-in for Excel™, 200 instances of the response
variable (in this case average reward for the group of Agents) are randomly selected
from the 3 Agents data subset. The selections are done with replacement, so the
same data point may be used more than once. The average of the 200 data points is
collected as an estimate of the overall population mean for a test run with 3 Agents
in the environment (regardless of the other factor settings). This process is repeated
10,000 times for the 3 Agent subset as well as every other subset.
The average of the 10,000 population mean estimates becomes the actual re-
sampled mean estimate with standard deviation also based on the 10,000 resampled
points. Figure 5.3 shows the mean average reward for each Agent size with 95 percent
confidence intervals. Average reward is not bounded. The graph indicates that the
number of Agents in the environment has a significant effect on the average reward
of the Agents. As the number of Agents increases, the average reward decreases. The
change in reward is attributed to the higher probability that one or more Agents is cor-
rupt in an environment with more Agents. This trend indicates that the TI-POMDP
results are influenced by the number of Agents in the environment. As the size of the
environment increases the average individual reward decreases due to Agents partic-
ipating in fewer tasks and tasks with more assigned Agents have a higher probability
of “betrayal” attempts which reduces the overall reward for the task.
Figure 5.4 shows the mean average reward for each reward level with 95 percent
confidence intervals using resampling. Average reward is not bounded. The graph
shows a significant quadratic increase in average reward as the reward level increases.
This increase is expected since the reward is based on the square of the reward level.
This trend indicates that the TI-POMDP results are influenced by the number of
Agents in the environment. As the reward structure of the environment changes to
benefit the Agents, the average individual reward increases because the TI-POMDP
is able to leverage the higher rewards.
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Figure 5.3: Average reward based on the number of Agents
in the Environment.
Figure 5.4: Average reward based on the number of reward
levels.
Figure 5.5 shows the mean average reward for each Agent mix with 95 percent
confidence intervals using resampling. Average reward is not bounded. While there is
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a difference between the average reward of mix 1 (all Agents have the same corruption
rate) and mix 2 (2 groups of Agents, where one group has a 10 percent higher proba-
bility of being corrupted than the other group), there is not a difference between mix
2 and mix 3 (3 groups of Agents, where one group has a 10 percent higher probability
of being corrupted and a second group has a 20 percent higher probability than the
baseline group). This indicates that a single group operating with a higher corruption
rate can achieve higher rewards than a uniform group, but additional groups do not
achieve a similar benefit. Since the difference in means between mix 1 and mix 2 is
only 1600 reward points (2.2 percent of average reward), the effect of agent mix is
negligible. The lack of effect indicates that the TI-POMDP is not heavily influenced
by heterogeneous Agents.
Figure 5.5: Average reward based on the mix of the Agents
in the Environment.
Figure 5.6 shows the mean average reward for each corruption rate with 95
percent confidence intervals using resampling. Average reward is not bounded. The
graph shows a significant exponential decrease in average reward as the corruption
rate increases. This increase is attributed to Agents not “cooperating” while “be-
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trays” become ineffective with the increasing corruption rate. This trend indicates
that the trustworthiness of the environment has a large impact on the TI-POMDP.
In low corruption environments, the TI-POMDP is able to “cooperate” extensively.
The TI-POMDP isolates (“works alone” or “conceals”) in high corruption environ-
ments. In between, the TI-POMDP has a steady decrease in rewards as it balances
“cooperating” and isolating actions.
Figure 5.6: Average reward based on the probability of Agent
corruption in the Environment.
Figure 5.7 shows the mean average reward for each redemption rate with 95
percent confidence intervals using resampling. Average reward is not bounded. The
graph shows a significant exponential increase in average reward as the redemption
rate increases. The higher redemption rate increases the probability that an Agent is
redeemed before it can “betray,” allowing the Agent to continue “cooperating” and
increasing the reward for each action. The TI-POMDP is affected by the environ-
ment’s redemption rate, but not to the same extent as the corruption rate. Higher
redemption rates reduce the potential for corruption because Agents may be redeemed
before they can “betray.”
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Figure 5.7: Average reward based on the probability of Agent
redemption in the Environment.
For the rest of the factor analysis, only the resampling results are shown since
the unequal variances affect the entire data set.
5.1.2 “Cooperates”. “Cooperates” is the number of times Agents attempt to
“cooperate” and the number of times the Agents successfully “cooperate.” Figure 5.8
shows the number of times Agents try to “cooperate” and the number of times they
succeed for each Agent size with 95 percent confidence intervals using resampling.
The number of “cooperates” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph indicates that Agents
“cooperate” less as the number of Agents increases. The fewer “cooperates” are due
to an increase in the number of Agents assigned to a task and a higher probability that
one of the Agents does not trust another Agent. The success rate of “cooperates” also
decreases as the number of Agents increases as seen in Table 5.2. The TI-POMDP
becomes less “cooperative” in larger environments because more Agents are assigned
to a task which increases the probability that the Agents do not trust at least one
assigned Agent. In this particular domain, the average task has just over half the
Agents assigned to it.
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Figure 5.8: Number of cooperates and successful cooperates
based on the number of Agents in the Environment.
Figure 5.9 shows the number of times Agents try to “cooperate” and the num-
ber of times they succeed for each reward level with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “cooperates” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows
a significant increase in both “cooperates” attempted and successful “cooperates” as
reward level increases. This increase is due to Agents “cooperating” on lower level
tasks to achieve higher rewards later. Table 5.2 shows the success rate of “cooperates”
is steady for the first two levels, but increases at the third level. The TI-POMDP
attempts to maximize its reward by “cooperating” more in environments with higher
reward levels. The higher levels generate higher payoffs, so the Agents, either trust-
worthy or deceitful, “cooperate” to get to the maximum reward level.
Figure 5.10 shows the number of times Agents try to “cooperate” and the num-
ber of times they succeed for each Agent mix with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “cooperates” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph in-
dicates that Agent mix does not have a discernible impact on “cooperating.” The
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Figure 5.9: Number of cooperates and successful cooperates
based on the number of reward levels.
“cooperate” success rate in Table 5.2 does not significantly change with the Agent
mix. Once again, the TI-POMDP is not affected by a heterogeneous group of Agents.
Figure 5.10: Number of cooperates and successful cooperates
based on the mix of the Agents in the Environment.
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Figure 5.11 shows the number of times Agents try to “cooperate” and the num-
ber of times they succeed for each corruption rate with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “cooperates” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows
that corruption rate decreases “cooperate” attempts and successes exponentially. As
all Agents become less trustworthy, the Agents become less willing to “cooperate.”
Table 5.2 shows that the success rate of “cooperates” decreases to 0.6 before leveling
off. The TI-POMDP becomes less likely to choose to “cooperate” as the probability
of Agent corruption increases.
Figure 5.11: Number of cooperates and successful cooperates
based on the probability of Agent corruption in the Environ-
ment.
Figure 5.12 shows the number of times Agents try to “cooperate” and the num-
ber of times they succeed for each redemption rate with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “cooperates” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows
an increase in the number of “cooperates” and the number of successful “cooperates”
as redemption rate increases. While both attempts and successes increase as the re-
demption rate increases, the attempts increase more. This results in a lower success
rate at higher redemption rates. Table 5.2 shows the diminishing success rate that
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Table 5.2: Cooperation success rate for each factor
setting.
Setting Number of Reward Agent Corruption Redemption
Agents Level Mix Rate Rate
1 76.1 70.6 71.9 88.8 79.6
2 70.6 69.1 71.8 81.4 75.6
3 66.9 74.9 71.8 74.9 74.6
4 - - - 70.7 72.4
5 - - - 67.1 71.7
6 - - - 64.4 71.2
7 - - - 62.5 70.3
8 - - - 60.6 70.0
9 - - - 60.2 70.2
10 - - - 59.2 70.2
levels off at 0.7. The TI-POMDP is able to attempt more “cooperates” because the
Agents are less likely to be corrupt for long periods of time.
Figure 5.12: Number of cooperates and successful cooperates
based on the probability of Agent redemption in the Environ-
ment.
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5.1.3 “Betrays”. “Betrays” includes the number of times Agents attempt to
“betray” and the number of times the Agents successfully “betray.” Figure 5.13 shows
the number of times Agents try to “betray” and the number of times they succeed for
each Agent size with 95 percent confidence intervals using resampling. The number
of “betrays” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows a constant linear decrease Agent
“betrayals” as the number of Agents increases. The fewer “betrays” are due to an
increase in the number of Agents assigned to a task and a higher probability that one
of the Agents assumes it is not the only Agent attempting to “betray.” The success
rate of “betrays” also decreases as the number of Agents increases as seen in Table
5.3. The TI-POMDP is less likely to attempt to “betray” in larger environments
because the tasks have more Agents assigned to them, increasing the probability that
at least one Agent is already not trusted.
Figure 5.13: Number of betrays and successful betrays based
on the number of Agents in the Environment.
Figure 5.14 shows the number of times Agents try to “betray” and the number
of times they succeed for each reward level with 95 percent confidence intervals using
resampling. The number of “betrays” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows a sig-
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nificant increase in both “betrays” attempted and successful “betrays” as the reward
levels go from 2 to 3, but the trends decrease as the level goes to 4. The changes are
due to Agents building trust on low reward level tasks to “betray” on high reward
level tasks. As the number of levels continues to increase, Agents are more apt to
wait for the highest reward levels, which occur rarely and the Agent may be redeemed
prior to reaching those levels. Table 5.3 shows the success rate of “betrays” is steady
for the first two levels, but decreases at the third level. After an initial jump, the
TI-POMDP actually decides to “betray” less as the reward level increases because the
“cooperating” to get to higher reward levels is in the Agent’s best interests. While
the Agents “cooperate” on several tasks to drive up the reward level they can be
redeemed before they reach the level they wanted to “betray” at. Additionally, since
the Agents complete a set number of tasks, they “cooperate” on a large number of
low reward tasks to get to the high reward.
Figure 5.14: Number of betrays and successful betrays based
on the number of reward levels.
Figure 5.15 shows the number of times Agents try to “betray” and the number
of times they succeed for each Agent mix with 95 percent confidence intervals using
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resampling. The number of “betrays” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph indicates
that Agent mix does not have a noticeable impact on “betraying.” The “betray”
success rate in Table 5.3 does not significantly change with the Agent mix either.
The TI-POMDP is not influenced by these heterogeneous groups of Agents.
Figure 5.15: Number of betrays and successful betrays based
on the mix of the Agents in the Environment.
Figure 5.16 shows the number of times Agents try to “betray” and the number
of times they succeed for each corruption rate with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “betrays” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows
that corruption rate increases “betray” attempts and successes up to a point before
the attempts and successes decrease. The peak of the “betrays” occurs with cor-
ruption rates between 0.15 and 0.3. In this range, the probability is that only one
Agent is corrupted at a time. As all Agents become less trustworthy, the Agents
become less willingly to “betray” since they do not trust the other Agents. Table 5.3
shows that the success rate of “betray” decreases to 0.64. The environment corrup-
tion rate influences the TI-POMDP’s usage of “betrayals.” In very trustworthy and
very corrupt environments, the TI-POMDP does not “betray.” In the very trustwor-
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thy environment, there are not any corrupt Agents (Utopian society). In the very
untrustworthy environment, everyone is corrupt so there is no benefit to betrayal
(honor among thieves). The TI-POMDP does try to “betray” in slightly corrupt
environments because only a few Agents become untrustworthy at any given time.
Figure 5.16: Number of betrays and successful betrays based
on the probability of Agent corruption in the Environment.
Figure 5.17 shows the number of times Agents try to “betray” and the number
of times they succeed for each redemption rate with 95 percent confidence intervals
using resampling. The number of “betrays” ranges from 0 to ∞. The graph shows
an increase in the number of “betrays” and the number of successful “betrays” as
redemption rate increases. As the probability of an Agent getting redeemed increases,
newly corrupted Agents are able to betray the newly redeemed Agents. Table 5.3
shows success rate staying around 0.73. The environment redemption rate increases
the TI-POMDP’s usage of the “betray” decision because Agents are more trusting of
each other when a given Agent is only corrupted for one or two actions.
As an excursion test, if the probability of corruption is 0.99 and the probability
of redemption is 0.01, the system stops “cooperating” and “betraying” completely.
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Figure 5.17: Number of betrays and successful betrays based
on the probability of Agent corruption in the Environment.
Table 5.3: Betrayal success rate for each factor set-
ting.
Setting Number of Reward Agent Corruption Redemption
Agents Level Mix Rate Rate
1 76.3 74.3 73.3 90.6 71.1
2 72.7 75.7 73.0 84.5 71.7
3 69.4 69.0 72.6 80.0 72.7
4 - - - 77.3 72.5
5 - - - 72.7 72.5
6 - - - 71.6 73.2
7 - - - 68.9 73.2
8 - - - 66.6 73.5
9 - - - 65.3 73.1
10 - - - 64.1 73.5
The Agents always choose to “work alone” or “conceal” and the average reward is
-2573 because the Agents lose 1 point every time they act and the majority of their
actions are “conceal” which does not quickly destroy an attacker.
72
5.2 Performance Test Results
The performance test measure the time required to complete 50 tasks by 3, 4,
or 5 Agents. Each test run uses a homogeneous group of Agents. For each task, the
Environment Controller selects a randomly sized subset of the group of Agents to
perform the task. After each action, Agents have 0.25 probability of becoming more
corrupt or trustworthy. The reward level setting for these runs is 2.
Figure 5.18 depicts the simulation time required to complete 50 tasks for 3, 4,
and 5 Agents. The steep trend between 4 and 5 Agents is indicative of the exponential
increase with respect to the overall number of Agents. Since τ contains n + (n− 1)2
ratings and each rating can take one of two values (the number of reward levels),
the state space difference between 4 and 5 agents is 221 − 213 = 2088960. The size
difference between 5 and 6 agents reaches 2145286496. While the behavior equivalence
approximation method reduces the amount of search space visited, the total search
space for 6 Agents is 1000 times larger than the search space for 5 Agents (231/221 =
28 = 1024).
The bulk of the computation time comes from learning the model. Figure 5.19
shows the time required to complete 50 tasks for 3 t o10 Agents when they do not
have to learn the policy model. In this case, the Agents just follow their current
trust ratings of the other Agents. The trend indicates that executing the TI-POMDP
updates is linear with respect to the number of Agents in the environment while
learning the policy suffers from exponential growth.
5.3 Comparison Test Results
Two comparison tests are used to measure the difference between the TI-POMDP
model and a Trust Vector model. The Trust Vector Model stores the five previous
actions of the other Agents. The Trust Vector length of five is consistent with the
TI-POMDP horizon of five. While the TI-POMDP is looking ahead five steps, the
Trust Vector looks at the previous five steps. Trustworthy actions enter the model
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Figure 5.18: Time required for a number of Agents to com-
plete 50 tasks.
Figure 5.19: Time required for a number of Agents to com-
plete 50 tasks without learning a decision model.
as a 1 while untrustworthy actions enter as a -1. Every time a new action occurs,
the action is inserted into the first model position, shifting the previous actions over.
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Table 5.4: Normalized average rewards and the av-
erage difference between agent rewards.
Average Reward
Average Reward Difference
Between Agents
TI-POMDP 1.0 0.29
Trust Vector 0.83 0.20
During the shift, a decay function is used to reduce the impact of previous actions on
the current model. For this testing, the decay function reduces the weight of previous
actions by five percent each time a new action is inserted. The five percent decay
rate is consistent with the five percent reward decay used by the TI-POMDP. The
Trust Vector model is used because it handles the trust modeling in a very different
manner from the TI-POMDP which already relies on experience modeling. Addition-
ally, the Defender simulation does not have the communication network required for
reputation modeling.
The first test uses the CTG. Agents must locate the tiger and the reward and
decide whether to cooperate with one another, betray each other, try to redeem
themselves, or reset the game so the other agent cannot betray them. Table 5.4
shows the normalized reward levels obtained by two trust models and the typical
difference in rewards achieved by the two agents during the same game. If the higher
scoring agent achieved 100 points using the TI-POMDP algorithm, the other agent’s
score was twenty-nine points lower. On average, TI-POMDP agents scored higher
than trust vector agents. The TI-POMDP algorithm reduced the number of reset
and redemption occurrences at lower reward levels which allowed more cooperation
and higher scores. The vector trust had a large increase of resets because the memory
function would make the agent suspicious. Table 5.5 shows the percentage of time
the agents take a particular action for both of the trust models.
The second test uses the Defender simulation. Both trust models are tested
with 3, 4, and 5 Agents, three separate reward levels (1, 2, and 3) and three separate
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Table 5.5: Percentage of agent actions for different
trust algorithms.
Agent Action TI-POMDP Trust
Vector
Cooperate 79.5 70.2
Betray 7.4 5.3
Redeem 10.1 1.6
Reset 3.0 22.9
levels of corruptions/redemption (0.1, 0.3, and 0.5). The models are also tested with
the three different Agent mixes. The number of times Agents choose to cooperate or
betray each other are tracked. The TI-POMDP is tested with an action horizon of 1
and 5.
The “cooperate” and “betray” actions are the high risk/high reward choices
for the domain. Even though “betray” actions are considered bad, successfully “be-
traying” other “cooperating” Agents results in a large reward indicating that the
“betraying” Agent made a good decision.
Table 5.6 illustrates the average number of times Agents choose to “cooperate”
or “betray” over the course of 50 Attackers. Since each Attacker requires multiple
actions before it is destroyed, Agents can take hundreds of total actions for 50 Attack-
ers. Overall, the TI-POMDP model with a horizon of 5 achieves higher “cooperate”
and “betray” success rates than the Trust Vector model. The Trust Vector and the
TI-POMDP with a horizon of 1 decide to “cooperate” and “betray” more, but are less
successful, which increases the number of required actions. As expected, the average
number of times Agents “cooperate” decreases while “betrays” increases as the prob-
ability of changing trustworthiness (Corruption/Redemption Rate) increases. This is
due to the fact that a corrupted Agent can immediately attempt to ‘betray” while a
redeemed Agent must first regain the trust of others before it can “cooperate.”
76
Table 5.6: Number of times Agents choose to “co-
operate” or “betray” using the TI-POMDP and Trust
Vector models. The success rates indicate the per-
centage of “cooperates” and “betrays” that achieve
the expected reward.
Corruption/Redemption
Model Action Rate
0 .1 0 .3 0 .5
Cooperations 94 .1 91.3 85.0
TI-POMDP Cooperation Success Rate 83 .5 70.0 61.0
Horizon 5 Betrays 15 .9 31.4 40.0
Betrayal Success Rate 79 .9 70.0 67.0
Cooperations 103.6 97.4 90.7
TI-POMDP Cooperation Success Rate 70 .2 58.6 47.9
Horizon 1 Betrays 19 .3 42.5 57.0
Betrayal Success Rate 68 .7 60.2 55.8
Cooperations 103.4 79.5 68.6
Trust Vector Cooperation Success Rate 70 .7 63.9 57.1
Betrays 42 .0 62.8 74.8
Betrayal Success Rate 63 .4 60.5 58.6
Figures 5.20 and 5.21 show that successful “cooperate” actions decrease and
successful “betray” actions increase as the corruption/redemption rate increases. The
drop in “cooperate” success is a result of fewer “cooperate” attempts and the higher
probability that an Agent immediately becomes corrupt after redeeming itself. The
“betray” success increase comes from the larger number of “betray” attempts that
occur as the corruption/redemption rate rises.
Table 5.7 illustrates the impact of the number of Agents, the number of reward
levels, and the Agent complexity has on the success of “cooperate” and “betray”
actions. While none of the factors have an affect on the “betray” success rate, two
factors affect the “cooperate” success rate. “Cooperate” success decreases as the
number of Agents increases. The decrease is due to larger numbers of Agents being
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Figure 5.20: The effect corruption/redemption rate has on
“cooperate” success.
assigned to tasks which increases the probability that one of them is untrustworthy.
Increasing the number of reward levels improves the number of “cooperate” successes.
This increase is due to untrustworthy Agents choosing to “cooperate” when the re-
ward level is low. The sharp decrease in “cooperate” success between Agent mix 1
(homogeneous set of Agents) and 2 (1 group of Agents is 10 percent more likely to be
corrupted than the other group of Agents) for the TI-POMDP appears to be a data
anomaly as that trend is not present in the rest of the test.
Table 5.8 shows the average number of each action chosen by the Agents. While
all models have a large number of Agents working alone and concealing their actions,
these individual behaviors account for nearly 66 percent of the Trust Vector and TI-
POMDP horizon 1 actions versus 56 percent of the TI-POMDP horizon 5 actions.
The lack of cooperation is the driving factor behind the Trust Vector requiring 1.5
times the number of actions as the TI-POMDP.
Table 5.9 shows the average reward of the Agents using the two models for each
corruption/redemption rate. The TI-POMDP achieves significantly higher rewards
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Figure 5.21: The effect corruption/redemption rate has on
“betray” success.
due to the increased success of “cooperate” and “betray” actions (positive rewards
instead of -100 rewards) and less use of “work alone” and “conceal” actions (-1 re-
wards). While the Trust Vector and the TI-POMDP with a horizon of 1 “cooperate”
and “betray” more, those actions are less successful which reduces the overall reward.
In both the CTG and the Defender simulation, the TI-POMDP outperformed
the trust vector with a decay function of five percent. The TI-POMDP requires 36.2
percent fewer actions than the trust vector model to accomplish the 50 tasks. This
reduction in actions results in a 3.8 times higher reward.
5.4 Summary
The TI-POMDP testing focuses on how a specific domain influences the decision
model’s output, the impact of environment size on the computation time of the model,
and a direct comparison of the TI-POMDP with a trust vector model. The factorial
analysis shows that factors influencing the reward, either directly (reward level) or
indirectly (number of Agents, corruption and redemption rates) impact the decisions
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Table 5.7: Impact of simulation variables on “co-
operate” and “betray” success for each corruption/re-
demption rate.
Factor Setting
Model Factor Action
1 2 3
Number of Cooperate 87.4 62.0 48.9
Agents Betray 20.9 21.7 20.3
TI-POMDP Reward Cooperate 41.7 69.5 87.0
Horizon 5 Levels Betray 15.8 24.6 22.6
Agent Cooperate 75.4 55.4 67.5
Complexity Betray 20.4 21.1 21.5
Number of Cooperate 93.2 81.7 77.6
Agents Betray 22.8 27.9 24.5
TI-POMDP Reward Cooperate 83.2 87.5 89.1
Horizon 1 Levels Betray 21.5 22.9 21.4
Agent Cooperate 83.5 79.2 84.6
Complexity Betray 22.3 24.7 27.1
Number of Cooperate 70.1 64.2 54.2
Agents Betray 58.3 60.2 62.9
Reward Cooperate 52.5 59.3 70.2
Trust Vector
Levels Betray 59.0 61.6 62.2
Agent Cooperate 56.4 60.1 63.3
Complexity Betray 57.3 61.9 64.7
and output of the TI-POMDP. Performance testing demonstrates that increases in
environment size (number of Agents) exponentially increases the time required to
learn decision policies and linearly increases the decision execution time. Comparison
testing indicates that the TI-POMDP outperforms the trust vector method with a
decay function of five percent in both the Defender simulation and the CTG.
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Table 5.8: Average number of times agents choose
each action.
TI-POMDP TI-POMDP
Action
Horizon 5 Horizon 1
Trust Vector
Cooperate 90.1 97.2 88.8
Work Alone 91.8 127.3 194.2
Betray 29.1 39.6 55.7
Conceal 110.9 157.2 180.4
Redeem 39.4 38.3 46.8
Table 5.9: The average reward of the Agents using
each model based on Corruption/Redemption Rate.
Corruption/
Model Redemption Rate
0.1 0.3 0.5
TI-POMDP(Horizon 5) 1667.0 1111.7 688.0
TI-POMDP(Horizon 1) -57.3 124.5 218.8
Trust Vector -136.4 73.6 143.8
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VI. Conclusions
A cooperative system allows a group of agents to perform complex tasks whileworking toward the common good. The agents decide to utilize the talents of
other agents by relying on their willingness to cooperate which is a product of mutual
trust between agents. Modeling the interaction of trust and agent decisions provides
an analysis of the effectiveness of the cooperative system.
This research merges the high level decision reasoning of a multi-agent environ-
ment with the individual oversight of trust modeling. The end result is a decision
framework that allows unique agents to evaluate the trustworthiness of one another.
The agents determine whether to work with other agents that may have different ca-
pabilities and different trust models. This investigation does not examine the impact
of an agent operating completely outside the framework or a group of agents working
together to subvert the ability of the framework.
The TI-POMDP framework outlined in Chapter III accomplishes the first re-
search objective in Chapter I. It models a complete multi-agent environment by
adding a trust model to the I-POMDP decision process. The Agents analyze their
current state, estimate the effect of their potential decisions, and select the decision
that is most likely to have the greatest future benefit. A key component of the entire
decision process is the Agent’s level of trust regarding the other Agents it interacts
with. This trust model helps determine the current state belief and controls the
reward function of the Agent.
The Defender simulation in Chapter IV fulfills the second research objective in
Chapter I. It creates a cooperative environment where Agents eliminate threats and
obtain individual rewards through cooperation and betrayal. The simulation uses
the TI-POMDP track the Agent’s trust ratings and makes action decisions based on
those ratings. Ultimately, an Agent’s success in this environment is dependent on the
accuracy of its trust model of the other Agents.
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6.1 Research Contributions
This research presents a novel model for cooperative multi-agent environments
where agents are potentially corrupt. It combines traditional trust modeling in Section
2.3 with a multi-agent decision process in Section 2.2 to model the interactions of a
group of agents.
6.2 Research Conclusions
Simulation testing described in Chapter V includes factor analysis, performance
testing, and comparison testing and illustrates the ability of the TI-POMDP to ef-
fectively reason within the simulation domain. The simulation factor analysis shows
that the number of Agents in the environment and the environment corruption rate
negatively impact Agent rewards and “cooperation” ability, while rewards levels and
redemption rate have a positive impact. Comparison testing between the TI-POMDP
and a trust vector model with five percent decay satisfies the third research objective
in Chapter I. Agents using the TI-POMDP model achieved 3.8 times the average
reward of Agents using a trust vector model.
The simulation demonstrates the TI-POMDP’s ability to allow Agents to make
decisions based on their level of trust and model of the environment. The Agents
continuously update their trust models and state beliefs to select what is predicted
to be the most beneficial action at a given time. The combination of trust modeling
and decision making enables the group of Agents to “cooperate” with one another to
achieve higher collective rewards.
6.3 Future Work
The future research with respect to the TI-POMDP framework can be divided
into two basic categories, improving the individual components of the framework and
finding the exploitable areas of the trust model. Both categories attempt to improve
the decision quality of the TI-POMDP.
83
• Policy Learning: the behavioral equivalence [16] policy learning method used
in this thesis is effective for small problems, but it did not scale well. Find-
ing a better solution would allow this simulation to tackle more complex trust
problems.
• Differing Agent Trust Models: the simulation tested uses identical trust models
for all of the Agents. If one Agent’s trust model is based on a trust vector
representation [17] while another uses a reputation model [18] the strengths and
weaknesses of the two models may affect the output of the simulation.
• Dynamic Trust Models: the Agents currently use a single trust model in their
decision process. Utilizing multiple trust models, similar to adaptive trust mod-
eling [10], could help an Agent make better decisions.
• TI-POMDP exploitation: the assumptions made by the simulation limit the
environment. Expanding what the environment allows can significantly impact
the performance of the TI-POMDP. The specific limitations include allowing
Agents to influence tasks they are not assigned to, allowing rogue Agents to
team up and cooperate together to drive up trust, moving the task assignment
to Agents which allows false tasks, and allowing untrustworthy Agents to “coop-
erate” versus just “betray” or “conceal.” Exploring the impact of these factors
can give greater insight into the ability of the TI-POMDP to reason over more
complex domains.
6.4 Final Remarks
Groups of autonomous agents can be leveraged to complete complex tasks be-
yond the individual agent capabilities. Success of these interactions requires coordi-
nation and cooperation between the agents, which implies a level of trust between
them. Without accurate trust models an autonomous agent may be susceptible to
exploitation, limiting their utility.
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